On 11 September 2020 The Supreme Court adopted a resolution according to which ‘if, as a result of the postponement of the deadline for the performance of the benefit, the claim is no longer due, its limitation shall begin to run again only as the new deadline expires’.
This resolution was adopted in response to the issue presented by the District Court in Warsaw, namely ‘Is it within the contractual freedom of contracts (Article 353[1] (k.c.) it is permissible for the parties to change the time limit for the claim by agreement after the claim has already become due?’
As a result of the postponement of the deadline for the performance of the benefit, the claim ceases to be due and the limitation period begins again only after the new payment deadline has expired.
Court second the instances pointed to various positions presented in the judicature and doctrine. He pointed out, for example, that there is a view in the case-law on the basis of which the parties to the contract may, in accordance with the principle of contractual freedom, change the time limit for the claim to be due after the conclusion of the contract, but only until the original deadline for the claim has expired.
Indicate that according to Article 120 k.c. the limitation period starts with the date on which the claim became due. If the claim is subject to a specific action by the rightholder, the period shall begin on the date on which the claim would become due if the rightholder had acted at the earliest possible time. In addition, the limitation period for claims for omission starts on the date on which the person against whom the claim is due does not comply with the content of the claim.
On the other hand, a claim becomes due when the creditor can effectively demand the debtor to make up for his claim order of SN from 12 February 1991, III CRN 500/90). Although the law does not define the concept of due diligence, it is accepted in the doctrine that due diligence must mean the condition in which the creditor has the legal capacity to claim the satisfaction of his claim. This is an objective potential condition which begins when the claim is activated.
Importantly, according to Article 119 k.c. time limits may not be shortened or extended by a legal act. However, it should be noted that the case at issue did not concern a change in the limitation period but a change in the maturity of the claim due to the extension of the debt repayment deadline. The limitation period therefore remained the same, but the time limit for the commencement of the limitation period changed.
The recognition of the inadmissibility of a contractual change in the due date of the claim would be contrary to the principle of contractual freedom and would result in numerous problems for both creditors and debtors. In the event of the debtor's temporary financial problems, the creditor would not be able to disagree with the request for a prolongation of the repayment deadline, as the claim would be subject to limitation regardless of the parties' mutual understanding of the modification of the payment deadline.
Therefore, the position presented by the Supreme Court in the resolution is not only in the interests of the debtor, who is often interested in concluding an annex to the contract, in which he undertakes to settle the claim at a later date, but also in the interests of the creditor, who is more worthy of accepting the postponement of the time limit for payment than to obtain legal claims, where that claim could be irreparable.
Thus, in conclusion, as a result of the postponement of the deadline, the claim ceases to be due and the limitation period starts again only after the new payment deadline has expired.
Author: Michał Wasilenko
Lawyer, Senior Associate in the Legal Department, member of the Bar Association in Lublin, graduate of the Faculty of Law and Administration at Maria Curie-Skłodowska University in Lublin. He specializes in commercial and civil law law.