The beginning of the 21st century is a time of mass lending by banks denominated or indexed to a Swiss franc. The borrowers, assured of the security and benefits of ‘franc loans’, signed contracts containing numerous legal defects, including unauthorised contractual provisions (abuse clauses).
Currently, the problems of credit agreements such as the abuzzness of conversion clauses, the failure of banks to comply with customer information obligations when concluding contracts and other infringements of banking and civil law are heavily affected by the courts of EU Member States, including Polish courts, and the TEU.
However, the main issue is the fact that such contracts are considered invalid in their entirety and the consequent need to settle the parties for the increasingly frequent annulment of such contracts by courts.
The considerations set out in this Article focus on the extremely relevant disputes raised in the context of the annulment of credit agreements on the limitation of the claims of borrowers who, when suing banks, demand reimbursement of the benefits paid by them to banks not due to them from the very moment the contract was concluded. The jurisprudence of the Polish courts and the TEU, whose judgments indicate that the limitation period can only begin once the borrower has acquired the knowledge that the contract he has concluded is defective, so that the action can be brought effectively.
Controversies around Swiss franc loans
first The decade of the 21st century in the banking sector in Poland is the time for most banks to provide so-called foreign exchange loans, particularly ‘franc loans’. The greatest increase in interest in this type of credit is among the clients of banks 2008 [1] , When banks offered, almost on a massive scale, such products.
The reason for this was the low rate of Swiss franc (CHF) at the time and the belief of bank representatives that the CHF currency was the most stable in the world thanks to the strong Swiss economy.
Moreover, the use of the conversion mechanism to CHF allowed to apply to the loan the LIBOR reference rate, which was significantly lower than the Polish interest rate based on WIBOR [2] .
These factors led to the possibility that the original instalments of the ‘franc loan’ could be even halved compared to the ordinary loan expressed in Polish gold (PLN). Moreover, some borrowers could not receive a standard gold loan at all because of their poor creditworthiness.
In such cases, bank staff offered the alleged "currency credit" as the only possible solution.
From the chart 1 However, there is a sharp decline in the course of the Swiss franc in 2008, up to and including below 2 PLN for 1 CHF.
Chart 1. Fluctuating Swiss Franc course for the period 3 January 2000–1 January 2010
Source: https://www.money.pl/pieniadze/kurs/chf,797.html (access: 27 February 2021).
However, the fact that credit has been granted in CHF for several years has been generating a lot of emotion and controversy, also becoming a field of political combat due to the possibility of banks violating the law.
The banks did not sufficiently comply with the information obligation during the meetings with potential borrowers (in particular, they did not provide sufficient information on the unlimited exchange risk and the possibility of securing themselves against it, and they did not explain precisely the functioning of the denomination/indexation mechanism and the rules on the fixing of exchange rates) and granted themselves the possibility to arbitrarily determine the amount of CHF's purchase and sale rates.
This resulted in indeterminate benefits, which often made the consumer uncertain how much money would be paid to the bank in fact and what would be the amount of subsequent instalments that he was obliged to give to the bank on a monthly basis.
Year 2020 seems to be a breakthrough in litigation by borrowers with banks [3] . The number of lawsuits against banks increased, and the court rulings (although still mostly invalid) began to fall in favour of borrowers. [4] .
A greater number of lawsuits are primarily the result of a favourable judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union [5] , which clearly influenced the case law of Polish courts. The issue of claims relating to ‘franc loans’ is becoming increasingly clear.
For the most part, the courts agree that credit agreements with a reference to the Swiss franc contain an abusive clauses on the indexation or denomination mechanism, mainly in terms of the possibility of arbitrary fixing of the rates of purchase and sale by the creditor due to the absence of any objective and understandable rules for calculating them in both the content of the credit agreement itself and its annexes.
However, the effects of the court declaring the whole or only part of the contract null and void to the borrowers, and consequently its continuation without unfair contractual provisions, remain unknown.
Among the question marks related to the acceptance of the contract is the problem of establishing the time limit for the limitation of claims on the bank vis-à-vis the client and the remuneration of the bank for the unconditional use of its capital by the borrower.
However, this ambiguous effect, which results in the recognition of the contested contractual provisions as ineffective, and the aspect of the mutual settlement of the parties to the credit agreement when it is declared invalid by the court, remains open until the subsequent judgments of the TEU and the NS, which are to be brought into line with the case-law.
Limitation of claims on indexed and denominated loans to Swiss francs
In court proceedings in which the request is to issue judgments of the banks to the borrowers of reimbursement of benefits paid under an invalid credit agreement, the possibility of limitation of claims [6] . Article 117(2) k.c.
states that: “After the expiry of the limitation period, the person against whom a claim is due may waive his satisfaction unless he waives the use of the limitation period.
However, the waiver of the limitation charge before the expiry of the time limit is invalid’, which means that, after the expiry of a certain period of time and the application by the rightholder of such a plea, it is not possible to exercise his rights in court.
However, such a claim does not expire but only changes its character to an incomplete (natural) obligation [7] . The creditor may then pursue his claim after the expiry of the limitation period, but the debtor is entitled to a charge [8] .
However, there is no contrary to the obligation for the debtor to carry out a statute of limitations or for the court to issue a judgment on that basis if no one has filed such a plea because the court does not in principle examine it of its own motion.
However, according to Article 117(21) k.c., which states that: ‘After the expiry of the limitation period, a claim against the consumer cannot be claimed’, the court verifies ex offico the limitation in cases where the trader and the consumer are parties.
The limitation institution therefore plays an important role in guaranteeing legal certainty, as evidenced by the rich achievements of doctrine and cited in footnotes of Polish and European jurisprudence [9] .
There are several procedural possible behaviours of borrowers in the ‘franc credit’ procedure. The borrowers may bring an action for the annulment of the credit agreement itself [10] or including payment of the benefits paid to the bank for its nullity.
It is also possible for them to require payment of overpaid instalments of credit for the recognition of provisions that shape the indexation/denomination mechanism as an abusive, and thus ineffective in relation to borrowers.
In such a case, a credit with a reference to a foreign currency shall be converted as if it were a standard gold loan from the beginning, however, under other contractual conditions (including interest rates based most often on the LIBOR reference rate). [11] – It's called deflation. [12] .
However, according to the current case-law (on a nationwide basis) the decisions indicating the nullity of the entire credit agreement are overwhelming. [13] , Therefore, these considerations will focus only on this claim.
Determination of the nullity of the credit agreement (establishment by the court of non-existence of a legal relationship according to Article 189 k.p.c. [14] ) is, however, a non-monetary claim because it is not intended to satisfy the plaintiff.
This means that such a request is not subject to limitation, as confirmed in the judicature of the Supreme Court [15] . On the other hand, the two previously mentioned claims for payment are cash claims and therefore according to Article 117(1) k.c. should be subject to limitation.
The case is of a property nature where the party’s claim is to exercise a right or power which is directly linked to the parties’ property relations.
It can be argued from the caselaw that ‘In so far as property matters are concerned, not only benefit cases but also cases relating to the establishment or formation of a legal relationship or a law, since in those cases the decision may also affect the property relations of the parties’ [16] .
In determining the relevant limitation period, it is important to determine the nature of the recipients’ benefits, i.e. whether the instalments paid by the borrowers constitute a periodic benefit.
one of the characteristics of the periodic benefit is that the subject of the benefit is money or goods marked generically; in addition, within the framework of one and the same legal relationship of the debtor is to fulfil a number of one-off benefits, which are fulfilled at certain regular intervals and which do not consist of a pre-defined whole [17] .
The analysis of these characteristics in the context of credit instalments paid by the borrower makes it possible to conclude that they do not constitute an interim benefit. This is a one-time benefit, however cash, with a fixed amount (this is the amount of credit granted in advance), although broken down into instalments [18] .
However, in the proceedings relating to these ‘franc loans’, it should be assumed that claims for payment relate to reimbursement of undue benefits whose claim is based on Article 405 k.c. in conjunction with Article 410 k.c. As claims for an undue benefit, they become due as soon as the benefit is fulfilled.
This means that if, from the outset, the benefit in question did not belong to the bank, the date on which the claim for recovery was due should be taken as an undue time when that benefit was fulfilled. [19] . However, it is a benefit which does not fall within the limits of the credit agreement concluded.
However, the claim for recovery of an undue benefit is a separate and non-contractual basis, arising from the law which requires a one-off recovery of the unduly fulfilled benefit [20] . This is an unlimited claim [21] , which expires on general terms, that is, according to Article 118 k.c. [22]
There is no doubt that the beginning of the limitation period for the recovery of an undue claim should be first the date on which the creditor could call on the debtor to fulfil the benefit [23] . Alternatively, the time limit for payment granted in the contract may be, for example, one week after each rest.
The case-law emphasises that a call for payment should be issued “in the earliest possible time, and thus in such a time since the undue benefit that is needed for recovery without undue delay. In some cases it may already be the day of the provision of an undue benefit’ [24] .
This term is fixed objectively, regardless of the awareness of the payment of an undue benefit. As has already been mentioned, this is the moment when an obligation arises that, in the context of the recovery of an undue benefit, is immediately the day of its fulfilment [25] .
When submitting this on the basis of the so-called franc cases, it should be assumed that for borrowers who have paid monthly credit instalments, the limitation period starts separately for each unduly fulfilled benefit (capital or interest payment paid) without having to be aware that the benefits they pay are undue and may call on the bank to reimburse them.
Such a solution is in line with the existing jurisprudence line, based only on the Polish legal order, indicating that the rightholder can call for the reimbursement of an undue benefit upon its fulfilment [26] .
To date, consideration of the impossibility of the borrowers' reimbursement of the benefit as an interim benefit and its recognition as an undue benefit allows for a six-year limitation period, calculated for each instalment paid separately.
However, when defining the limitation period, it is important that the amendment of the Civil Code which entered into force 9 July 2018, the overall limitation period was 10 years (not as at present 6 years) and it was not assumed that the end of the limitation period was on the last day of the calendar year, unless shorter than 2 years.
According to Article 5(3) Act dated 13 April 2018 amending the Law – Civil Code and certain other laws “to the consumer’s claims arising before the date of entry into force of this Act and on that date not yet published, whose limitation periods are specified under Article 118 and Article 125(1) Amended Act under Article 1, the provisions of the Amended Act shall apply under Article 1, in the existing version’ [27] .
This means that for benefits paid by consumers to the bank before the date of entry into force of the proposed amendment, that is before 9 July 2018, used ten-year the date counted for each loan instalment separately.
However, the limitation periods for claims for interim benefits and claims relating to the pursuit of business activities which are equal to 3 years.
However, as regards the settlement of the parties in the event of the annulment of a credit agreement with a reference to a Swiss franc, there is a discrepancy in the previously described scope, i.e.
the calculation of the limitation period from each receivable paid separately, regardless of the knowledge or not, as to the invalidity of the benefit.
Some common courts apply the theory in existing judgments that take account of the claim two conditioning [28] , by judging from the bank as a party to the defendant to the borrowers their loan instalments and other credit charges during the 10 years before the action [29] .
However, such a case law must be considered to be contrary to European Union law, and to a harmful consumer, who is clearly weaker in the dispute with the bank.
The Court of Justice of the European Union considers, however, that it is essential for such cases to be dealt with by individual circumstances such as the length of the undertaking or the borrower's awareness of the existence of the abuzz clauses in the credit agreement concluded by him, the Polish legislation on the limitation period for the reimbursement of benefits not due at all.
„Franc’ credit agreements and EU consumer law
Community law earlier, and now European Union law attaches great importance to consumer protection as a weaker party in all legal relations, especially in disputes with traders, both in terms of their ability to negotiate effectively, their knowledge and their ability to obtain and analyse the information they provide. [30] .
With this in mind, the Council of the European Union, in order to best integrate its values in the Member States, has adopted, together with the European Parliament, Directive 93/13 dated 5 April 1994 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [31] , which entered into force 16 April 1993, in Poland, it began to apply from its entry into the European Union, i.e.
from 1 May 2004. However, it should be stressed that according to Article 10(1) Directive 93/13 refers only to contracts concluded after 31 December 1994, on which the deadline for transposition expired. Moreover, that legislation does not apply to contracts that were signed before the country concerned joined that union. [32] .
Ratio legis introduction Directive 93/13 it was necessary to ensure that no EU Member State placed unfair conditions [33] in contracts between consumers and sellers of goods or service providers [34] .
This was necessary due to the divergence of laws in the Member States at the time, which could have led to infringement of competition rules.
The directives addressed to EU countries are binding on the outcome to be achieved through the legislation in question, but do not impose on them the forms or measures to be applied for this purpose [35] .
Article 8 Directive 93/13 sets out the minimum requirements to be met by the Member States and leaves them with the possibility of using more developed consumer protection in their own legal order.
one of the main assumptions Directive 93/13 there is a requirement that contracts be drawn up in a simple, understandable and appropriate language for the recipient.
In addition, the consumer should have a real opportunity to become familiar with all the conditions, rights and obligations and any doubts should be interpreted in his favour.
A particularly important provision for borrowers has been made under Article 6(1) Directive 93/13, In which it is stressed that: ‘Member States shall provide that, under national law, unfair terms in contracts concluded by sellers or suppliers with consumers will not be binding on the consumer and that the contract will continue to apply to the parties as long as it is possible after unfair terms have been excluded from it’.
Recognising a condition as unfair means that it should be treated as never existing and thus non-binding consumers [36] . It is a mandatory provision aimed at restoring equality between the parties [37] . This protection cannot be lost or renounced.
Contrary to the interpretation that sometimes appears in literature and jurisprudence, it must be firmly recognised that it is impossible to maintain a credit agreement in force after it excludes the contested provisions providing for an indexation/denomination mechanism. It must be pointed out that, in such a situation, it would be impossible to continue to execute the credit agreement, since it would be excluded
the provisions on the conversion of the payment and repayment of the loan by exchange rates from the banking table would prevent the use of valorisation to be the substance and nature of the contract. Furthermore, the converted loan agreement would leave a interest rate based on LIBOR instead of the standard gold loans of WIBOR.
Both the removal of indexation/denomination while at the same time leaving the principle of interest counting on the LIBOR rate and possibly replacing it by WIBOR appears to go beyond the possibility provided by Article 3851(2) k.c.
There is no form of contract in shape after the so-called defranking on the market, nor was it ever available in any offer of the bank, which makes it clear that it follows from the circumstances that, without the provisions affected by the nullity, the operation would not have been carried out, which is compatible with the Article 58(3) k.c.
This is shared in the case law [38] . Similarly, the Court of Justice of the European Union has pointed out that the whole agreement may be declared invalid if there are grounds for this in national law and "this solution will provide a better protection for the consumer" [39] .
According to Article 7 Directive 93/13 Member States are to use measures to prevent unfair conditions in consumer contracts [40] .
In the context of the ‘franc cases’ under consideration, the content Directive 93/13 is therefore particularly important, mainly because banks use their stronger position vis-à-vis borrowers and use contractual standards (often difficult to understand for the average consumer of content) not subject to any negotiation.
The banks also often failed to inform customers sufficiently about the potential risks associated with, for example, the potential sudden increase in the Swiss franc rate and the impact of such a situation on the amount of the loan instalment and the total value of the liability expressed in PLN.
However, the bank should provide the borrower with a hypothetical simulation of the credit dependency on the exchange rate growth by 10, 20, 50, 100 or even 200% and thus clearly obtain information from the consumer whether this risk is acceptable [41] .
Purpose of the legislation Directive 93/13, as has already been described, consumer protection is the worst side of business.
However, what needs to be stressed is the possible scope of consumer protection expressed in Directive 93/13 does not coincide with the statute of limitations governed by Polish provisions of the Civil Code which do not sufficiently protect the consumer, as EU law does.
Without doubt, the purpose of the limitation institution in the national legal order is to protect the debtor by ensuring that there is no timeless uncertainty when the creditor will be able to demand the fulfilment of his benefit.
Such authorisation should be limited in time by applying clear and objective criteria, which is what this regulation is doing [42] .
In ‘franc cases’, the borrower, as a consumer, is weaker than the bank, which is a huge financial institution. However, it is the borrowers who demand the reimbursement of unduly paid benefits, indicating their presence as creditors and the trader as debtor. It is easy to notice here the conflict of Polish legal standards with EU values.
The application of national statute of limitations distorts consumer protection created by the EU system (Articles 6(1) and 7(1) Directive 93/13), because an entrepreneur applying unfair conditions does not in fact suffer much inconvenience, and in some situations it is even more favourable than the affected counterparty.
The EU Directive provides for full consumer protection, including the right to restitution arising from unfair contractual conditions.
Polish statute of limitations rules do not grant any additional rights to consumers who are in dispute with an entrepreneur who has more knowledge and experience than them, which he used in formulating his own contractual standards.
The Civil Code clearly indicates a certain limitation period and does not provide for any exceptions (Article 118 k.c. in conjunction with Article 119 k.c.). On the other hand, a specific right has already been granted to the trader to avoid the expiry of the limitation period for a claim against the consumer (Article 1171 k.c.).
This means that there is currently a high risk in court proceedings that the borrower's claim will only be taken into account for benefits fulfilled during the period 10 years prior to the action, and the bank's request to recover the amount of the loan launched — in full.
This makes it highly likely that despite the consumer's payment of credit instalments for several years on the basis of an invalid contract (due to unfair conditions in the contract) concluded with an entity recognised in the public opinion as a public trust institution and the payment of the nominal amount of credit, as well as the winning of long-term and costly litigation, it will continue to be a debtor of the bank [43] .
A characteristic feature of the implementation of EU law is that it does not contain procedural standards, which is also demonstrated in Directive 93/13. The protection of consumer rights described above is part of material law, which is implemented by the procedural standards of the Member States.
This is due to the principle of procedural autonomy, which states that Member States may choose or establish appropriate procedural law provisions from their own legal system for claims under Community law.
However, this principle applies only to cumulative adherence two other principles, namely the principle of equivalence and the principle of efficiency, also called the principle of effectiveness. [44] .
first they provide that national law relating to claims under Union law must not be worse than the domestic rules governing similar proceedings against national law.
second The principle, on the other hand, in some ways requires a Member State to apply standards in such a way that they do not prevent or significantly impede the exercise of EU powers [45] . This means that the principle of procedural autonomy gives way to ensuring the effectiveness of Union law [46] .
This argues that in the ‘franc credits’ proceedings, it is important to synchronise substantive consumer law created within the European Union with Polish procedural rules.
However, the principles set out above clarify that this national legal order must be created and interpreted in the most effective way possible to achieve the objectives of European law.
Such a combination of national and EU legal order interpreted and interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union in a broad case-law translates into a specific treatment of limitation institutions in the field of ‘franc loans’ which begins to be applied by the Polish courts common and noted as a point for consideration by the Supreme Court.
Bibliography
Literature
Jedlinski A., Comment to Article 118(11), [in:] A. Jedliński et al., Civil Code. Comment, t. 1. General part, ed. A. Kidyba, 2012, https://sip.lex.pl/#/commentary/587244927/128175?keyword=A.%20Jedli%C5%84ski%20Kodeks%20cywilny&tocHit=1&cm=SFIRST
Kowalik-Bańczyk K., Uniform application of EU competition law as a restriction to the procedural autonomy of national competition authorities. Gloss to TS judgment dated 3 May 2011, C-375/09, „European Judicial Review’ 2012, No 2.
- , replacing LIBORU with another indicator in credit agreements will not be easy, Prawo.pl 2019, https://sip.lex.pl/#/external-news/1795599600?keyword=LIBOR&cm=STOP
Rudke M., Returned to the FCC battles, customers win more often, “Rzeczpospolita”, https://www.rp.pl/Banki/307029880-Wracaja-frankowe-batalie-klienci-czesciej-wygrywaja.html
Rycko N., Comment to Article 117(11-15), [in:] Civil code. General. Comment to selected recipes, ed. J. Gudowski, 2018, https://sip.lex.pl/#/commentary/587825866/623306/gudowski-jacek-red-kodeks-cywilny-czesc-ogolna-komentarz-do-wybranych-przepisow?keyword=naturalne&cm=URELATIONS
Tuszynski R., Changes in LIBOR and WIBOR in 2021 – amendment of the WMD Regulation, 2020, https://ksiegowosc.infor.pl/obrot-gospodarczy/finanse-i-inwestycje/4660177 ,Changes-in-LIBOR-i-WIBOR-in-2021-year-revision-Regulation-BMR.html.
Legal acts
Directive 93/13 dated 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (Official Journal of the European Union L, No. 95, p. 29 to 21 April 1993).
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union of 25 March 1957 (official publication from 2004, volume 90, item 864/2 of 30 April 2004).
Act dated 23 April 1964 – Civil Code (text one. Journal of Laws of 2020, item 1740).
Act dated 17 November 1964 – Code of Civil Procedure (OJ No 43, item 296).
Act dated 13 April 2018 amending the Act – Civil Code and some other laws (Journal of Laws, item 1104).
Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on the interpretation and application of the Council Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts (Official Journal of the European Union C (2019), No. 323, p. 4).
Judgment
Order of the SN dated 4 March 2016, reference no. I CZ 8/16, LEX No. 2015128.
Order of the EUSC dated 3 July 2014, reference no. C-92/14, Liliana Tudoran and Others v SC Suport Colect SRL, LEX No. 1480274.
SN Resolution dated 17 February 2006, reference no. III CZP 84/05, LEX No. 171726.
SN Resolution dated 5 November 2014, reference no. III CZP 76/14, LEX No. 1532595.
SN Resolution dated 16 February 2021, reference no. III CZP 11/20, LEX No. 3120579.
Judgment SA in Katowice dated 17 July 2020, reference no. I ACa 589/18, LEX No. 3056665.
Judgment SA in Łódź dated 28 December 2016, reference no. I ACa 776/16, LEX No. 2216130.
Judgment of SA in Szczecin dated 18 March 2013, reference no. I ACa 822/12, LEX No. 1344220.
Judgment of SA in Szczecin dated 15 March 2017, reference no. I ACa 1023/16, LEX No. 2307624.
SA judgment in Warsaw dated 8 November 2018, reference no. V ACa 742/17, LEX No. 2705011.
SA judgment in Warsaw dated 13 November 2019, reference no. I ACa 268/19, LEX No. 2776065.
SA judgment in Warsaw dated 28 November 2019, reference no. V ACa 490/18, LEX No. 2767463.
SA judgment in Warsaw dated 4 December 2019, reference no. I ACa 66/19, LEX No. 3103362.
Judgment of the SN dated 1 March 1963, reference no. III CR 193/62, LEX No. 104925.
Judgment of the SN dated 27 August 1976, reference no. II CR 288/76, LEX No. 2056.
Judgment of the SN dated 2 October 1998, reference no. III CKN 578/98, LEX No. 1214910.
Judgment of the SN dated 22 March 2001, reference no. V CKN 769/00, LEX No. 49111.
Judgment of the SN dated 24 April 2003, reference no. I CKN 316/01, LEX No. 112177.
Judgment of the SN dated 8 July 2010, reference no. II CSK 126/10, LEX No. 602678.
Judgment of the SN dated 5 April 2012, reference no. II CSK 473/11, LEX No. 1170228.
Judgment of the SN dated 28 October 2015, reference no. II CSK 822/14, LEX No. 1930449.
Judgment of the SN dated 29 September 2017, reference no. V CSK 642/16, LEX No. 2434728.
Judgment of the SN dated 29 October 2019, reference no. IV CSK 309/18, OSNC 2020, No 7–8, item 64.
Judgment of the SN dated 27 November 2019, reference no. II CSK 483/18, LEX No. 2744159.
Judgment of the SN dated 11 December 2019, reference no. V CSK 382/18, LEX No. 2771344.
SO judgment in Bielsko-Biała dated 14 January 2022, reference no. I C 157/21, non-publ.
Judgment of SO in Bydgoszcz dated 13 January 2022, reference no. I C 899/20, non-publ.
SO judgment in Katowice dated 10 January 2022, reference no. I C 1043/20, non-publ.
SO judgment in Krakow dated 24 June 2020, reference no. I C 1836/19, http://orzeczenia.ms.gov.pl/details/chf/152010000000503_I_C_001836_2019_Uz_2020-06-24_002
Judgment of SO in Poznań dated 10 January 2022, reference no. XVIII C 86/21, non-publ.
Judgment of SO in Świdnica dated 13 January 2022, reference no. I C 691/20, non-publ.
Judgment of SO in Tarnów dated 12 January 2022, reference no. I C 674/20, non-publ.
SO judgment in Warsaw dated 8 May 2019, reference no. XXV C 134/19, LEX No. 2686594.
SO judgment in Warsaw dated 26 June 2019, reference no. XXC 2720/18, LEX No. 2742680.
SO judgment in Warsaw dated 20 December 2019, reference no. XXV C 2120/19, LEX No. 2774422.
SO judgment in Warsaw dated 17 November 2020, reference no. III C 449/18, non-publ.
SO judgment in Warsaw dated 7 December 2021, reference no. XXVIII C 2662/21, non-publ.
SO judgment in Wrocław dated 15 January 2015, reference no. II Ca 1695/14, LEX No. 1841661.
SO judgment in Wrocław dated 20 November 2020, reference no. I C 685/20, non-publ.
SO judgment in Wrocław dated 29 November 2021, reference no. I C 1047/19, non-publ.
Judgment of the Court of Justice dated 19 June 1990, reference no. C-213/89, The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factorname LTD and Others, LEX No. 128409.
Judgment of the Court of Justice dated 15 March 2012, reference no. C-453/10, Jana Pereničová and Vladislav Perenič v SOS financ, spol. S r.o., LEX no. 1122804.
Judgment of the Court of Justice dated 14 June 2012, reference no. C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito SA v Joaquín Calderón Camina, LEX No. 1164386.
Judgment of the Court of Justice dated 21 February 2013, reference no. C-472/11, Banif Plus Bank Zrt v Csabie Csipai and Viktória Csipai, LEX No. 1276264.
Judgment of the Court of Justice dated 30 May 2013, reference no. C-488/11, Dirk Frederik Asbeek Brusse and Katarina de Man Garabito v Jahani BV, LEX No. 1315834.
Judgment of the Court of Justice dated 3 October 2013, reference no. C-32/12, Soledad Duarte Hueros v Autociba SA and Automóviles Citroën Espana SA, LEX No. 1371965.
Judgment of the Court of Justice dated 17 July 2014, reference no. C-169/14, Juan Carlos Sánchez Morcillo and María Del Carmen Abril García v Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA, LEX No. 1491080.
Judgment of the Court of Justice dated 21 December 2016 in the combined cases C-154/15, C-307/15 and C-308/15, Francisco Gutierrez Naranjo and Others v Cajasur Banco SAU, LEX No. 2168030.
Judgment of the Court of Justice dated 23 January 2019, reference no. C-387/17, Presidenza Del Consiglio Dei Ministri v Fallimento Traghetti Del Mediterraneo Spa, LEX No. 2609299.
Judgment of the Court of Justice dated 3 October 2019, reference no. C-260-18, Kamil and Justyna Dziubak v Raiffeisen Bank International AG, operating in Poland as a branch under the name Raiffeisen Bank International AG Branch in Poland, ECLI EU C of 2019 item 819.
Judgment of the Court of Justice dated 30 April 2020, reference no. C-627/18, Nelson Antunes da Cunha LDA vs Instituto de Financiamento da Agricultura e Pescas IP (IFAP), LEX no. 2956648.
Judgment of the WSA in Warsaw dated 14 November 2018, reference no. III SA/Wa 56/18, LEX No. 2735533.
Internet sources
https://bochenekiwspolnicy.pl/podsumowanie-2020r-w-sprawach-frankowych/
https://businessinsider.com.pl/piec-tematow-o-gospodarce-ktore-musisz-znac-raport-16-lutego/fmbpl8c
https://kslegal.com.pl/kredyty-chf-przedawnienie-roszczen/?fbclid=IwAR2cTD3ioCGobDzV2ro1N6SZvOnQD3UE6jrZdvd94RIqpMFzlOqjrgjIqZI#.XwbuHSUwglQ
https://subiektywnieofinansach.pl/covid-19-frankowicze-wyssali-caly-zysk-bank-millennium-pokazuje-jak-sobie-radzi-wyniki-2020/
https://wibor.money.pl/ .
https://www.bankowebezprawie.pl/w-2019-roku-69-procent-spraw-zostalo-wygranych-prawomocnie-przez-klientow-bankow/
https://www.money.pl/gielda/getin-bank-milczy-ws-ugod-z-frankowiczami-koszty-bylyby-ogromne-6612328012344224a.html
https://www.money.pl/gielda/kredyty-frankowe-wiekszym-problemem-niz-koronawirus-prezes-mbanku-ostro-o-sadach-6612281383431072a.html
https://www.money.pl/pieniadze/depozyty/walutowe/
https://www.money.pl/pieniadze/kurs/chf,797.html
https://www.rp.pl/Opinie/310229917-Spread-walutowy-a-kredyt-we-frankach--czy-oplaca-sie-go-przewalutowac.html
https://www.temidium.pl/artykul/zasada_autonomii_proceduralnej_w_prawie_unii_europejskiej_i_jej_ograniczenia_w_praktyce-957.html
https://zbp.pl/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/Wskaznik-SARON-zastapi-LIBOR-CHF
[1] According to the data provided in the Credit Information Office in 2019 in Poland active 451,630 liabilities in Swiss francs with a total value above 101,000,000,000 PLN Polish. see https://www.rp.pl/Opinie/310229917-Spread-walutowy-a-kredyt-we-frankach--czy-oplaca-sie-go-przewalutowac.html (access: 22 November 2020).
[2] For example 27 February 2008 WIBOR 3M reference rate 5.85 On the same day, LIBOR 3M oscillated around the height 2.7867 p.p. see https://wibor.money.pl/orazhttps://www.money.pl/pieniadze/depozyty/walutowe/ (access: 27 February 2021).
[3] Profit of Bank Millennium in 2018 was 761,000,000 PLN, In 2019 Now. 561,000,000 PLN, a 2020 only 23,000,000 PLN. This bank has created a reserve for losses to be made to borrowers for which it has allocated a total of 900,000,000 PLN (since October 2020 rod 380,000,000 PLN), And it's just 6.7% the value of the entire book of frank loans. Please indicate that 2019 in Polish general courts was about 3500 cases against this bank, whereas in 2020 Now. 5500; see https://subiektywnieofinansach.pl/covid-19-frankowicze-wyssali-caly-zysk-bank-millennium-pokazuje-jak-sobie-radzi-wyniki-2020/ (access: 3 March 2021). The French-friendly jurisprudence line also influenced the finances of mBank, whose profit last year fell by 90% (over 1,000,000,000 PLN to 104,000,000 PLN) as a result of the creation of huge financial reserves (1,300,000,000 PLN, And it's just about 9.6% the value of the franc mortgages granted by that bank). Last year, it was going on. 7508 cases against this bank (of which 173 ended with a final judgment and only 70 was beneficial to him) on the total value of claims in the amount 1,500,000,000 PLN. In December mBank accepted the probability of losing at the level 50%; see https://www.money.pl/gielda/kredyty-frankowe-wiekszym-problemem-niz-koronawrus-prezes-mbanku-ostro-o-sadach-6612281383431072a.html (access: 3 March 2021). On the other hand, Getin Noble Bank only established a reserve for 110,000,000 PLN (at the end of September 2020 the sum of its loan portfolio was around 9,000,000,000 PLN), However, it no longer meets EU capital requirements. This means that the bank is loss-making. The solution proposed by some authorities to ‘franc cases’ through agreements with borrowers would mean a cost of around 3,200,000,000 PLN, While last September's equity capital of Getin Noble Bank oscillated around the amount 2,100,000,000 PLN, which means the insolvency of the bank. On the other hand, the value of claims from cases pending in courts (about 4200) approximately 1,200,000,000 PLN; see https://businessinsider.com.pl/piec-tematow-o-gospodarce-ktore-musisz-znac-raport-16-lutego/fmbpl8corazhttps://www.money.pl/gielda/getin-bank-milczy-ws-ugod-z-frankowiczami-koszty-bylyby-ogromne-6612328012344224a.html (access: 3 March 2021).
[4] From the available data, the overall 2020 fell around 1000 judgments, of which 92% was beneficial to the borrowers. In December alone 2020 the courts issued 148 judgments (132 in the first instance, a 15 in the second instance, including 90% favorable to Frankowists), which was a record throughout the year. It is worth mentioning that the sum of all the values of the content of disputes in ‘franc cases’ is estimated at 5,000,000,000 PLN, and at present only 8% all persons holding ‘franc credits’; see https://bochenekiwspolnicy.pl/podsumowanie-2020r-w-sprawach-frankowych/ (access: 3 March 2021). According to the data provided by ‘Rzeczpospolita’ In June 2020 fell at least 49 judgments (6 final), of which 31 was the determination of the nullity of the contract, 13 concerning the so-called deflation, 2 waived the judgment of the court of first instance, and only 1 was beneficial to the bank; see M. Rudke, return the frank battles, customers win more often, “Rzeczpospolita”, https://www.rp.pl/Banki/307029880-Wracaja-frankowe-batalie-klienci-czesciej-wygrywaja.html (access: 21 November 2020). In contrast, 2019 The francos won the final round around 69% cases where, following the October judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter: the TEU) on the State of Dziubak, consumers have obtained favourable final judgments in approximately 75% cases; see https://www.bankowebezprawie.pl/w-2019-roku-69-procent-spraw-zostalo-wygranych-prawomocnie-przez-klientow-bankow/ (access: 21 November 2020).
[5] Judgment of the Court of Justice dated 3 October 2019, reference no. C-260-18, Kamil and Justyna Dziubak v Raiffeisen Bank International AG, operating in Poland as a branch under the name Raiffeisen Bank International AG Branch in Poland, ECLI EU C of 2019 item 819.
[6] On limitation institutions see Article 117 and n. Act dated 23 April 1964 — Civil Code (text one. Journal of Laws of 2020, item 1740), Next: k.c.
[7] Wider see WSA judgment in Warsaw dated 14 November 2018 (reference no. III SA/Wa 56/18, LEX No. 2735533), One of the things that says: “This obligation does not cease, but only becomes a natural obligation. Civil law continues to treat the debtor from a statute of limitations as a debtor, with only the difference that it refuses the creditor legal protection, including in particular refuses to apply state coercion to enforce the claim. Similarly, civil law treats game and bet obligations (Article 413 The Civil Code) and just as in the case of a statute of limitations does not consider the fulfilment of such a provision to be undue, as a result of unjust enrichment of the person who received the benefit. This is the difference between the limitation of the civil and tax liability – first of them still exists and second It irreparably expires in an inefficient manner, resulting in overpayment of the past tax obligation.’
[8] see N. Rycko, Comment to Article 117(11-15), [in:] Civil code. General. Comment to selected recipes, ed. J. Gudowski, 2018, https://sip.lex.pl/#/commentary/587825866/623306/gudowski-jacek-red-kodeks-cywilny-czesc-ogolna-komentarz-do-wybranych-przepisow?keyword=naturalne&cm=URELATIONS (access: 22 November 2020).
[9] see Judgment of the Court of Justice dated 23 January 2019, reference no. C-387/17, Presidenza Del Consiglio Dei Ministri v Fallimento Traghetti Del Mediterraneo Spa, LEX No. 2609299, point 71; Judgment of the Court of Justice dated 30 April 2020, reference no. C-627/18, Nelson Antunes da Cunha LDA vs Instituto de Financiamento da Agricultura e Pescas IP (IFAP), LEX no. 2956648, point 44.
[10] „Actions to establish the existence or non-existence of a legal or legal relationship (Article 189 (k.p.c.) shall always be entitled if the plaintiff demonstrates his legal interest, whether there are sufficient substantive grounds to take account of that action, but his consideration shall be dependent on confirmation as a result of the judicial procedure that there have been material reasons on which the action was based" — judgment of the Supreme Court dated 5 April 2012, reference no. II CSK 473/11, LEX No. 1170228.In addition, in the SA judgment in Szczecin dated 18 March 2013 (reference no. I ACa 822/12, LEX No. 1344220) it was added that ‘the nullity of the legal act is ex tunc, by law. In principle, it is acceptable on the basis of Article 189 k.p.c. establishing that a legal act is invalid. An action for determination may be brought at any time as it requires the establishment of a law or legal relationship according to the condition existing at the time of judgment — Article 316(1) k.p.c.’.
[11] It should be pointed out that, following the UK's withdrawal from the European Union, British surveillance has stopped publishing LIBOR rates at the end 2021, amending the Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council of the EU Directive 2016/1011 dated 8 June 2016 on indices used as benchmarks in financial instruments and financial contracts or to measure the performance of investment funds. The European Commission's proposal is to add a new article that would enable LIBOR to be replaced by law (not requiring an annex to the contract to be included for that purpose) with another indicator if ‘the cessation of this publication could cause significant distortions in the functioning of the financial markets in the Union’. This issue was highlighted, among other things, by SO in Warsaw in its judgment dated 8 May 2019 (reference no. XXV C 134/19, LEX No. 2686594) whether in the judgment dated 26 June 2019 (reference no. XXC 2720/18, LEX No. 2742680). see also J. Ojczyk, replacing LIBORU with another indicator in credit agreements will not be easy, Prawo.pl 2019, https://sip.lex.pl/#/external-news/1795599600?keyword=LIBOR&cm=STOP (access: 22 November 2020); Mr Tuszynski, Changes in LIBOR and WIBOR in 2021 — amendment of the WMD Regulation, 2020, https://ksiegowosc.infor.pl/obrot-gospodarczy/finanse-i-inwestycje/4660177,Zmiany-w-LIBOR-i-WIBOR-w-2021-roku-nowelizacja-rozporzadzenia-BMR.html (access: 22 November 2020). From 1 January 2022 LIBOR reference rate is replaced by SARON; see https://zbp.pl/aktualnosci/wydarzenia/Wskaznik-SARON-zastapi-LIBOR-CHF (access: 23 January 2022).
[12] Judgment of the SN dated 29 October 2019, reference no. IV CSK 309/18, OSNC 2020, No 7–8, item 64.
[13] see SO judgment in Bielsko-Biała dated 14 January 2022, reference no. I C 157/21, non-publ.; SO judgment in Świdnica dated 13 January 2022, reference no. I C 691/20, Non-publ.; judgment of SO in Bydgoszcz dated 13 January 2022, reference no. I C 899/20, non-publ.; judgment of SO in Tarnów dated 12 January 2022, reference no. I C 674/20, non-publ.; judgment of SO in Katowice dated 10 January 2022, reference no. I C 1043/20, nonpubl.; judgment of SO in Poznań dated 10 January 2022, reference no. XVIII C 86/21, non-publ.; judgment of SO in Warsaw dated 7 December 2021, reference no. XXVIII C 2662/21, non-publ.; SO judgment in Wrocław dated 29 November 2021, reference no. I C 1047/19, non-publ.
[14] Act dated 17 November 1964 – Code of Civil Procedure (Journal of Laws, item 296); Further: k.p.c.
[15] Judgment of the SN dated 27 August 1976, reference no. II CR 288/76, LEX No. 2056; SN judgment dated 1 March 1963, reference no. III CR 193/62, LEX No. 104925.
[16] Order of the SN dated 4 March 2016, reference no. I CZ 8/16, LEX No. 2015128.
[17] A. Jedliński, Comment to Article 118(11), [in:] A. Jeliński et al., Civil Code. Committee, t. 1. General part, ed. A. Kidyba, 2012, https://sip.lex.pl/#/commentary/587244927/128175?keyword=A.%20Jedli%C5%84ski%20Kodeks%20cywilny&tocHit=1&cm=SFIRST (access: 21 November 2020).
[18] Wider see SN judgment dated 2 October 1998, reference no. III CKN 578/98, LEX No. 1214910; judgment of SA in Warsaw dated 8 November 2018, reference no. V ACa 742/17, LEX No. 2705011.
[19] Judgment of the SN dated 22 March 2001, reference no. V CKN 769/00, LEX No. 49111.
[20] SO judgment in Wrocław dated 15 January 2015, reference no. II Ca 1695/14, LEX No. 1841661.
[21] „Obligations whose term of performance is neither marked nor derived from the nature of the obligation and are subject to the creditor’s will by making an appropriate declaration of will (Article 455 in fine k.c.). In such a commitment, the benefit should be fulfilled immediately after the debtor has been summoned by the creditor’ — SN resolution dated 5 November 2014, reference no. III CZP 76/14, LEX No. 1532595.
[22] see SA judgment in Szczecin dated 15 March 2017, reference no. I ACa 1023/16, LEX No. 2307624; judgment of SA in Łódź dated 28 December 2016, reference no. I ACa 776/16, LEX No. 2216130.
[23] According to Article 120(1) k.c. regulating the start of the limitation period: ‘The limitation period shall begin on the date on which the claim became due. If the claim is subject to a specific action by the rightholder, the period shall begin on the date on which the claim would become due if the rightholder had acted as soon as possible.’
[24] Judgment of the SN dated 29 September 2017, reference no. V CSK 642/16, LEX No. 2434728.
[25] Judgment of the SN dated 24 April 2003, reference no. I CKN 316/01, LEX No. 112177; SN judgment dated 8 July 2010, reference no. II CSK 126/10, LEX No. 602678.
[26] Judgment of the SN dated 28 October 2015, reference no. II CSK 822/14, LEX No. 1930449; Resolution of SN dated 5 November 2014…
[27] Act dated 13 April 2018 amending the Act – Civil Code and some other laws (Journal of Laws, item 1104).
[28] „This means that if, as a result of the conclusion of the contract, each party has fulfilled a benefit to the benefit of the other parties, either in the event of the termination of the contract or in the event of the collapse/abnormality of the contract due to its inability to maintain it after the liquidation of the abusing provisions, each of them has its own claim for reimbursement of the performance of the benefit, the bank for reimbursement of the amount of the loan transferred and the borrower for reimbursement of the benefits provided to the bank in the performance of the credit agreement. Clearing an invalid contract on the basis of the provisions on undue benefit is a clean restitution return of what has been provided. Of course, there are no obstacles to the mutual deduction of benefits, but only if this is the result of the will of both parties or one of the party making the statement of the hit and filing the procedural charge of the hit” — SA judgment in Warsaw dated 13 November 2019, reference no. I ACa 268/19, LEX No. 2776065. The rightness of this theory also acknowledged the SN in the resolution dated 16 February 2021 (reference no. III CZP 11/20, LEX No. 3120579), in which he considered that: ‘The party which, in the performance of the credit agreement which was annulled, repaid the loan shall be entitled to a claim for reimbursement of the funds paid as an undue benefit (Article 410(1) with regard to Article 405 (kc) whether or not and to what extent he is a debtor of the bank for the refund of the amount of credit unduly received.’
[29] see SO judgment in Wrocław dated 20 November 2020, reference no. I C 685/20, non-publ.; judgment of SO in Warsaw dated 17 November 2020, reference no. III C 449/18, non-publ.; judgment of SA in Katowice dated 17 July 2020, reference no. I ACa 589/18, LEX No. 3056665.
[30] Judgment of the Court of Justice dated 17 July 2014, reference no. C-169/14, Juan Carlos Sánchez Morcillo and María Del Carmen Abril García v Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA, LEX No. 1491080, point 22 and the caselaw cited there.
[31] Directive 93/13 dated 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts (Official Journal of the European Union L, No. 95, p. 29 to 21 April 1993), Next: Directive 93/13.
[32] Order of the EUSC dated 3 July 2014, reference no. C-92/14, Liliana Tudoran and Others v SC Suport Colect SRL, LEX No. 1480274.
[33] According to Article 3(1) Directive 93/13: „Contractual terms which have not been individually negotiated shall be deemed unfair if, contrary to the requirements of good faith, they create a significant imbalance under the agreement of the rights and obligations of the parties to the detriment of the consumer." On the other hand, section 2 It adds that: ‘The terms of the contract will always be considered non-negotiable individually if they have been drawn up in advance and the consumer has therefore not had an impact on their content, especially if they have been presented to the consumer in the form of a pre-established standard contract’. Furthermore, the Directive provides that negotiating individual issues does not prevent it from being applied if the agreement is adhesive. Furthermore, the burden of proof to prove an individual agreement on the terms of the contract lies with the entrepreneur.
[34] In Polish legal order for the consumer, according to Article 22 1 k.c., ‘a natural person carrying out a legal activity with an entrepreneur not directly related to his or her business or profession’ is recognised, whereas in EU legislation, on the basis of Article 2 point (b) Directive 93/13, it means ‘any natural person who, in agreements covered by this Directive, acts for purposes not related to trade, business or profession’. Under the concept of entrepreneur with Article 431 k.c. is understood as: ‘the natural person, the legal person and the organisational unit in question under Article 331(1), conducting business or professional activities on their own behalf.’ Directive 93/13 distinguishes only the seller and supplier he considers under Article 2 point (c): „any natural or legal person who, in agreements covered by this Directive, acts for trade, business or profession purposes, whether or not it belongs to the public or private sector.’
[35] Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union of 25 April 1957 (official publication from 2004, volume 90, item 864/2 of 30 April 2004), Article 288.
[36] Judgment of the SN dated 27 November 2019, reference no. II CSK 483/18, LEX No. 2744159; Judgment of the Court of Justice dated 21 December 2016 in the combined cases C-154/15, C-307/15 and C-308/15, Francisco Gutierrez Naranjo and Others v Cajasur Banco SAU, LEX No. 2168030, point 61-62.
[37] Judgment of the Court of Justice dated 30 May 2013, reference no. C-488/11, Dirk Frederik Asbeek Brusse and Katarina de Man Garabito v Jahani BV, LEX No. 1315834, point 38; Judgment of the Court of Justice dated 14 June 2012, reference no. C-618/10, Banco Español de Crédito SA v Joaquín Calderón Camina, LEX No. 1164386, point 40; Judgment of the Court of Justice dated 21 February 2013, reference no. C-472/11, Banif Plus Bank Zrt v Csabie Csipai and Viktória Csipai, LEX No. 1276264, point 20.
[38] Judgment of the SN dated 11 December 2019, reference no. V CSK 382/18, LEX No. 2771344; judgment of SA in Warsaw dated 28 November 2019, reference no. V ACa 490/18, LEX No. 2767463; SO judgment in Warsaw dated 20 December 2019, reference no. XXV C 2120/19, LEX No. 2774422 and the judgment of SO in Krakow dated 24 June 2020, reference no. I C 1836/19, http://orzeczenia.ms.gov.pl/details/chf/152010000000503_I_C_001836_2019_Uz_2020-06-24_002 (access: 23 January 2022).
[39] Judgment of the Court of Justice dated 15 March 2012, reference no. C-453/10, Jana Pereničová and Vladislav Perenič v SOS financ, spol. S r.o., point 36.
[40] Communication from the Commission, Guidelines for the interpretation and application of the Council Directive on unfair terms in consumer contracts (Official Journal of the European Union C (2019), No. 323, p. 4), point 5-6.
[41] see judgment of SA in Warsaw dated 4 December 2019 (reference no. I ACa 66/19, LEX No. 3103362), in which one can read, among other things, that: “It should be noted, however, that the defendant is not able to carry out any simulations of the possible increase in foreign currency and the conversion of this effect to the amount of the instalment. It cannot be overlooked that the possible fluctuations in foreign currency rates and the threshold when the profitability of the foreign credit vis-à-vis gold ends. Only indicated and explained that a loan in foreign currency is more favourable than a gold loan, i.e. that the instalments are simply lower, as a result of another loan interest rate model, while clearly failing to provide simulations, under which circumstances the loan rate in foreign currency may exceed the one presented in PLN. In addition, the risk of borrowing in a non-profit currency. Nor can it be overlooked that the defendant, as a professional with financial analysts, did not inform the client either what would happen to the loan instalment and the remaining capital if the cyclical crisis in the global financial market is imminent and what would happen if the banks stopped offering “currency loans”.
[42] SN Resolution dated 17 February 2006, reference no. III CZP 84/05, LEX No. 171726.
[43] For a better picture of the situation, a hypothetical fact can be cited in which the borrower took a loan of 300,000 PLN and po 17 to 25 years of the loan period have already been repaid 320,000 PLN, However, the court only judges the benefits of the last 10 years in amount 270,000 PLN, and the bank’s claim for return on capital takes into account in its entirety. This means that, in fact, the consumer, despite the payment of the nominal amount of credit, still has to repay 30,000 PLN. Such a solution does not meet the objectives Directive 93/13, because the trader is not severely sanctioned for the application of unfair contractual terms to consumers.
[44] The principle of effectiveness has been applied, inter alia, in the judgment of the ECJ dated 3 October 2013 reference no. C-32/12, Soledad Duarte Hueros v Autociba SA and Automóviles Citroën Espana SA, LEX No. 1371965), in which the consumer requested, by court, the cancellation of the contract concluded with the car vendor on account of the leaking sliding roof. However, the referring court referred to Article 3(6)) Directive 1999/44, according to which the consumer does not have the right to cancel the contract if the non-compliance with the contract is negligible. According to the legal act in question, it is possible to reduce the price. However, the party did not issue such a claim and, under national law, the court is obliged to issue a decision as requested. The CJEU concluded that the national court may, of its own motion, grant the consumer an appropriate price reduction in this case. The EU Court found that such a solution was beneficial to the consumer and Spanish law was not flexible in consumer disputes.
[45] K. Kowalik-Bańczyk, Uniform application of EU competition law as a restriction on the procedural autonomy of national competition authorities. Gloss to TS judgment dated 3 May 2011, C-375/09, „European Judicial Review’ 2012, No 2, p. 39–45; Judgment of the Court of Justice dated 14 June 2012, reference no. C-618/10, Banco Español De Crédito SA v Joaquín Calderón Camino, LEX No. 1164386, point 46.
[46] K. Kowalik-Bańczyk, Uniform application of EU competition law as a restriction on the procedural autonomy of national competition authorities. Gloss to TS judgment dated 3 May 2011, C-375/09, „European Judicial Review’ 2012, No 2, p. 39–45; Judgment of the Court of Justice dated 14 June 2012, reference no. C-618/10, Banco Español De Crédito SA v Joaquín Calderón Camino, LEX No. 1164386, point 46.
Author: Bartłomiej Makowski. graduated from the Faculty of Law at the University of Wrocław. Lawyer at the Law Office Paweł Borowski.
Article reprinted with permission of the author. Source: Student Law, Administrative and Economic Work, Wroclaw University