In recent years, we can observe the socio-political emphasis on reducing aggressive cross-border tax planning, identified in particular among global actors.
In view of the above, efforts to reduce this harmful activity have been stepped up among the countries associated with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (hereinafter OECD).
With the support of countries not members of the OECD and developing countries, a report was published to create the basis for action to limit this anti-fiscal trend. It is called the BEPS Action Plan (Base Erosion and Profit Shifting).
This package has become a comprehensive set 15 areas of action to prevent tax base reduction and profit transfer, including certain minimum standards, common solutions, guidelines and best practices in the field of taxation. Using the BEPS solutions, Member States can implement them into their legal order.
Introduction
It should be noted that, despite such an important task as the BEPS regulations, they did not have binding force under international law, because they were so-called soft law.
These recommendations were adopted after some time by the Council of the European Union, which also stressed the need to find common but flexible solutions at EU level consistent with OECD proposals. At the same time, the Council agreed with the OECD's priority that taxes should be paid where profits and value are generated.
Finally, this led to the announcement of the text Directive 2016/1164 to 12 July 2016 1 and Directive 2017/952 to 29 May 2017 amending Directive 2016/1164 on hybrid mismatches between countries third 2 (hereinafter jointly referred to as the ATAD Directive) laying down rules to counter tax avoidance practices that have a direct impact on the functioning of the internal market.
The main purpose of the provisions of the ATAD Directive is to establish rules against the erosion of tax bases on internal markets and the transfer of profits outside the internal market. The Directive indicates that for this purpose, provision must be made for:
- • restrictions on the possibility of deduction of interest,
- • taxation of unrealised capital gains in the event of transfer of assets, tax residence or permanent establishment (exit taxation),
- • general rules against tax avoidance,
- • rules on controlled foreign companies,
- • rules against hybrid mismatches.
Limitation of interest deductibility
At this point it is worth mentioning that the Polish Act with 15 February 1992 on corporate income tax 3 (Next: the Corporate Income Tax Act) it already had regulations that limited the possibility of charging interest to the cost of obtaining revenue, but they only referred to loans granted to the taxpayer by the entity that was associated with it.
These provisions provided that interest on loans granted to the company by the entity holding at least the latter should be excluded from the cost of obtaining revenue 25% shares. Later, these links were no longer relevant as the legislator limited all interest, including those resulting from loans and loans drawn from banks, i.e.
entities not related to the company. In 2015 The provisions of the abovementioned Act also introduced a variant method of calculating the so-called ‘insufficient capitalisation’, which required the notification of a willingness to apply it by at least 3 years. This calculation had to be reported to the proper head of the tax office.
In addition, the Act provided that the other applicable limit based on the NBP reference rates and profit of the company was limited not only by interest paid to related parties but also to unrelated parties. It can therefore be concluded that these provisions were very similar to the newly implemented regulations.
After implementation of the ATAD Directive, for loans and loans from 2018 only provisions based on the principles of this Directive have already been applied. According to the new regulations, the possibility of deducting debt financing costs from revenue has been limited to the limit 3,000,000 PLN.
If this threshold is exceeded the limit shall apply 30% EBITDA. Although the ATAD Directive allows a Member State to introduce much higher amounts of surplus that can be deducted, the Polish legislator has significantly understated them. Initially, this limit was to be even 120,000 PLN, But it was eventually changed.
In order to illustrate the assumptions that arose at ATAD level, it should be noted that the upper deduction limit in that Directive was set at the level 3,000,000 EUR.
At this point, it is also worth noting the problem which was created during the revision of the rules on the limitation of debt financing costs. Under Article 15c(12) the Corporate Income Tax Act is the definition of debt financing costs. This category includes, inter alia, the percentage part of the leasing instalment.
The problem is that the legislator has not introduced the definition of the percentage part of the leasing instalment in the law.
The problem becomes even more pressing if it is seen that the ATAD Directive does not use the term ‘interest part of the leasing instalment’, but the phrase ‘interest element of financing for financial leasing payments’ 4 .
In addition, the reimbursement of the ‘interest component of financing for financial leasing payments’ is not defined under the ATAD Directive.
It seems appropriate to interpret that ‘the percentage part of the lease instalment’ should be understood as the value of the lease instalment exceeding the initial value of the leased asset within the meaning of Article 17g the Corporate Income Tax Act 5 , However, the lack of a legal definition of that term may give rise to a different understanding by taxpayers and tax representatives. The practice shows that if such a problem is not resolved in advance by the legislator, it may turn out that the interpretation doubts in this area will not be resolved until years later.
Exit tax
one from the disputed issues which emerged after the implementation of the Directive into Polish law, there is a tax on income from unrealised profits, i.e. the so-called exit tax.
The uncertainty that had been accompanied before the introduction of the exit tax regulation was due to the fact that the scope of the proposed regulation was unknown. It was clear from the wording of the ATAD Directive that, as a general rule, it lays down rules on taxation only for taxable persons subject to corporation tax.
On the other hand, the Polish legislator has argued that the ATAD Directive does not prohibit a Member State from introducing regulations at a higher level of protection, and therefore considers that exit tax may also include taxpayers of income tax on individuals.
In this context, it is worth to cite the parliamentary interpelling of Mr Isabella Leschina 6 , in which she asked the Ministry of Finance whether a Polish engineer or director went to work abroad over 183 the days may give rise to the obligation to pay tax on shares held and equity participation titles.
The reply received from the Ministry of Finance was: “There is no concern that a Polish engineer or director may be required to pay tax on his or her shares or shares if their total value does not exceed 4,000,000 PLN”. This interpretation shows that exit tax may concern entities that do not take action to avoid taxation in Poland.
Both for personal income tax 7 , as well as corporate income tax, taxation is subject to:
- The transfer of an asset outside the territory of the Republic of Poland, as a result of which the Republic of Poland loses in whole or in part the right to tax the proceeds from the disposal of that asset, while the transferred asset remains the property of the same entity;
- Change of tax residence by the taxpayer subject to the tax obligation in the Republic of Poland on all of his income (unlimited tax obligation) resulting in the Republic of Poland losing in whole or in part the right to tax the proceeds of the disposal of the asset owned by that taxpayer, in connection with the transfer of its registered office or management to another State[8].
A catalogue of situations indicating the transfer of assets outside the territory of the Republic of Poland is open and specifically covers situations where:
- The Polish tax resident transfers to his foreign establishment an asset so far connected with activities carried out in the territory of the Republic of Poland;
- The tax resident transfers to the country of his tax residence or to a country other than the Republic of Poland where he operates through a foreign establishment, an asset previously associated with the activity carried out in the territory of the Republic of Poland by a foreign establishment;
- The tax resident transfers to another country all or part of the activities carried out so far through a foreign establishment located on the territory of the Republic of Poland[9]. Temporary transfer of assets outside the territory of Poland (no more than one year) is not subject to tax exit tax.
Both u.p.d.o.f. and the Corporate Income Tax Act provide for the exemption from taxation of assets transferred to public benefit organisations and intended for the use of official workers. The legislator provided for a very short deadline for payment of tax on unrealised profits. Well, exit tax is subject to payment to 7.
the day of the month following that in which the assets were transferred. Moreover, an appropriate tax return should be made within the same period.
The taxpayer may seek reimbursement of the tax paid on unrealised gains if within the time limit 5 years will carry the asset back to Poland or return permanently to Poland and establish its tax residence in Poland.
The rate of tax on unrealised gains shall be as follows:
- • 19% – is valid for fixed-tax assets, or
- • 3%, which will be used for those components whose value is not to be determined.
The tax, by decision of the head of the tax office, may be distributed into instalments (for a period not exceeding 5 years). The obligation on taxable persons to pay the tax immediately or to make the right to postpone payment of the tax on unrealised profits (by placing it in instalments) incompatible with the provisions of the ATAD Directive, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union and the principle of freedom of establishment contained under Article 49 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
Original text Article 5(2) The ATAD Directives constitute ‘A taxpayer Shall be given the right to defer the payment of anex it tax referred to in section 1, by paying it in installations over five years, in any of the following circuits.’ Consequently, this provision should read as follows: ‘The taxpayer shall have the right to postpone payment of the tax in question. Under section 1, by paying it in instalments by five years in any of the following circumstances:’ The original Polish text of the ATAD Directive is as follows (Article 5(2)): „The taxpayer may receive the right to postpone payment of the tax on unrealised capital gains in question Under section 1, the distribution of instalments for at least a period of time five years in each of the following situations:’
This means that the Polish text of the ATAD Directive has been mistranslated and may be misunderstood. Article 5(2) The ATAD Directives should be interpreted in accordance with the context of the case law of the TEU, which means that the taxpayer must be entitled to postpone payment of tax on unrealised profits without introducing additional criteria.
Consequently, the dependence of that right on the discretion of the tax authority, which can only grant such consent at the request of the taxpayer, is contrary to the provisions of the ATAD Directive, which in principle introduces automation in this respect.
This means that tax collection should only take place when the taxpayer obtains actual income from the sale of assets rather than at the tax stage of hypothetical future revenues. Such an interpretation of the provisions of the ATAD Directive is in line with the case law of the TEU.
In its rulings, the TEU stresses that in order to ensure that the tax on unrealised profits does not undermine the freedoms of the EU's single market, it is necessary to postpone it, equalising the treatment of taxpayers from those freedoms which benefit and carry out cross-border relocations, whether it is their own tax residence or their own part of the property, granted automatically.
For example, in the judgment with 29 November 2011 10 The EUSC decided that ‘Article 49 The TFEU must be interpreted as contrary to the legislation of a Member State which imposes the immediate collection of tax on unrealised profits relating to the assets of the company transferring its registered office to another Member State already at the time of that transfer.’ In the judgment of the Court of Justice of 25 April 2013 11 , where in the thesis 37 He pointed out that: ‘However, there is evidence that the granting of such a deferred payment, which is subject to different requirements and can only be achieved if the economic and financial situation of the taxpayer temporarily prevents it from making payments within the prescribed time limits, is in no case automatic.
It cannot therefore be considered that this mechanism offers the taxpayer an alternative to the immediate payment of the tax, so that it cannot constitute a remedy to the fact that the immediate payment is contrary to the freedom of establishment" (self-translation of the Author).
Similar conclusions can be found in cases C-9/02 12 and C-470/04 13 . Thus, in principle, the solution introduced by the Polish legislator, which requires the taxpayer to pay immediately the income tax which he has not yet obtained, or to give consent by the head of the tax office to pay the tax in instalments, violates the principle of freedom of establishment, as defined by under Article 49 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
There are also important reservations regarding the compatibility of the exit tax rules with other fundamental principles on which the functioning of the European Union is based, i.e. the principle of freedom of movement of persons and capital[14]. The doctrine also includes views questioning the compatibility of exit tax with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland[15].
General anti-tax avoidance provisions
Amendment with 23 October 2018 the statutory definition of tax avoidance has been amended, as part of the implementation of the provisions of the ATAD Directive, and in particular its Article 6(1).
This definition provides that an operation does not result in a tax advantage if the achievement of that advantage, contrary to the object or purpose of the tax law or its provision, was the principal or one from the main objectives of achieving it and the mode of action was artificial.
The difference with the earlier provisions of the clause means extending its scope. The amended provision provided that it could only be applied if the operation was carried out “in particular in order to achieve a tax advantage”. This amendment entered into force on the day 1 January 2019.
As can be seen from the justification for the draft amendment 16 , a summary of the two criteria for the activity of the taxpayer leads to the conclusion that the standard in the ATAD Directive for the application of the national anti-avoidance clause, measured by recourse to the Spiritus movens of the taxpayer, was higher than for the general clause contained under Article 119a as it has been so far.
The amendment should balance these criteria.
Such wording of the clause indicates that the demonstration that the tax advantage was not the sole objective, but merely one of many other economic or economic objectives, should lead to the non-application of the clause.
The mere fact of the existence of a tax advantage, even a substantial one, cannot be the basis for the application of the clause, unless it is the only advantage[17].
It is also worth noting that tax avoidance will not be the taxpayer's action through the use of tax preferences and benefits arising directly from the provisions of tax laws.
In such a situation, it is difficult to say that this would constitute a violation of the object or purpose of the law, since, in the intention of the legislators, it is to encourage[18].
According to the motive 11 The preamble to the Directive, the purpose of the implementation, should be "to combat tax fraud for which specific provisions have not yet been adopted". one The objectives imposed are therefore to fill the current and future tax gaps and to reduce their negative effects.
However, the general standards adopted should not apply to already existing specific anti-abuse standards.
‘The fundamental difference between the operation of the general and specific standards is that only this first allows for reclassification of the transaction carried out by the taxpayer and, as a result, apply the tax effects to the relevant activities and not those which the taxpayer has carried out, which deprives him of the tax benefit.
The special standards, on the other hand, deprive the taxpayer of the tax advantage without interference in the transactions he has made. Thus, in all cases of tax avoidance, where the requirement to deprive the taxable person of an unauthorised tax advantage is to reclassify the transaction, a general standard must be applied." 19 .
The generality of the clause allows it to be applied to any activity aimed at achieving artificial tax advantages, regardless of the entity. The exception is only the tax on goods and services 20 , where a specific tax avoidance clause is established directly in the legislation.
The Directive implemented sets limits on permissible tax optimization. In the context of current globalisation of taxation and multinational cross-border schemes, the clause provides for equal treatment of taxpayers.
Furthermore, importantly, clause regulations are in force in most western countries, so it would be difficult to accept their absence in the Polish legal order[21].
The tax consequences of an operation which satisfies the conditions for the application of the general clause shall be determined on the basis of the situation which would have occurred if the operation had been carried out accordingly.
‘It is considered appropriate that an entity would, in the circumstances in question, carry out an activity if it acted reasonably and was guided by legitimate objectives other than to achieve a tax advantage contrary to the object or purpose of the tax law or its provision, and the way in which it acted would not be artificial.
Appropriate action may also consist of failure to act’ 22 . When implementing the provisions of the Directive, the legislator stressed that not only action is appropriate, but also omission.
In assessing the conduct, on the assumption of reasonableness, it can be concluded that a legal entity with a non-tax benefit would not take any action.
In line with the practice developed, the Council Directive does not lay down specific concepts in its legislation, leaving this to the jurisdiction of the Member States. Therefore, the legislator was obliged to define a concept such as a tax advantage, taking into account the principles of the European Treaties and, above all, the principle of proportionality[23]. The definition of the tax advantage states that it is 24 :
- • non-deductible tax liability, withdrawal or reduction of the amount of the tax liability,
- • the rise or rise of the tax loss,
- • there is an excess or right to refund or an excess or refund,
- • no obligation for the payer to collect the tax if it is due to the circumstances indicated in point (a).
The wording of this definition in the dictionary of statutory terms, containing legal definitions, gives it a universal character and refers to all other such phrases in the O.P. An important reason for the definition of tax avoidance is the artificial mode of action. According to Article 119c o.p.
‘The method of action is not artificial if, on the basis of the existing circumstances, it must be assumed that an entity acting sensibly and legitimately would apply this method to the greatest extent for legitimate economic reasons’. This provision is positive, indicating the mode of action which is correct or actual.
It can therefore be concluded that the object or purpose of the tax law or its provision will be one of the most important thought processes in assessing whether a taxpayer's action is aimed at tax avoidance. This was motivated by the recommendations of the European Commission from 6 December 2012 on aggressive tax planning[25].
It promoted the introduction of rules which would not take into account artificial arrangements.
In the light of the current legislation, the mode of action can be assessed as artificial in particular when:
- • unjustified division of operations, or
- • involve intermediaries in the absence of economic or economic justification, or
- • elements leading to an identical or similar condition to that existing before the operation, or
- • reciprocal or compensating elements, or
- • an economic risk that exceeds the expected non-tax benefits to such an extent that it should be considered that a reasonable operator would not have chosen to do so, or
- • where the tax advantage achieved is not reflected in the economic risk or cash flow incurred by the entity, or
- pre-tax profit which is negligible compared to a tax advantage which does not result directly from an economic loss actually incurred, or \ involve an entity that does not have an actual economic activity or does not have a significant economic function, or which has its head office or residence in a country or territory specified in the legislation issued on the basis of Article 23v(2) U.p.d.o.f. or Article 11j(2) the Corporate Income Tax Act
This calculation is purely exemplary and open. It refers to an assessment of an economic or economic nature and the characteristics of the calculations demonstrate their actual rather than legal nature. They therefore concern the elements of the facts of the case, the analysis of which allows only proper legal assessment.
‘The tax authority’s demonstration of the taxpayer’s activities primarily in order to achieve the tax advantage must be factual rather than hypothetical.
Otherwise, it will not be possible to determine the actual (real) relationship between the tax benefit action and the economic (economic) objective, which also brings certain material benefits.
Thus, the tax authority will be required to determine what tax advantage it is and what size it will have as a result of the subsumation of the established facts to an appropriate legal standard.’ 26 .
The doctrine assumes that the behaviour of taxable persons who are subject to the anti-avoidance clause (or are subject to that clause) is not illegal. They shall remain in accordance with the applicable legal order.
These provisions do not impose a general prohibition on such activities, but only introduce specific legal arrangements concerning the tax consequences of such activities[27].
It is also worth noting that, despite the increasing autonomy of tax law towards civil and commercial law, it is impossible to deny the obvious links between the two legal systems.
This means, therefore, that the tax effects of the occurrences must be considered solely on the basis of tax law and that the clause itself, as a standard of tax law, cannot enter the sphere of private law, which can lead to a situation where the tax effects are determined differently from the formal form of such activities.
Controlled Foreign Business Rules (CFCs)
Controlled Foreign Companies (CFCs) is an internationally widely accepted mechanism to combat tax abuses in relations between related parties, by demonstrating income generated from domestic activities as income of entities under the tax jurisdiction of countries applying preferential tax rules.
Clarifying these rules one from the activities specified in the BEPS report, which became the basis for the introduction of the ATAD Directive. The aim of the amendment of the CFC rules is to combat harmful competition from those parts of the countries which apply taxation at preferential rates, i.e. tax havens.
The provisions on CFC also provide for the prevention of postponement or avoidance in those tax havens.
From 1 January 2019 in the use of the mechanism for shifting income to local subsidiaries, the phrase ‘foreign controlled company’ is replaced by the term ‘foreign controlled entity’ by the Income Tax Act 28 .
The amendment also changed the definition of the concept of related entity 29 , reducing the requirements for participation in capital, voting rights or the right to participate in profit to 25%, as well as the concept of a foreign controlled entity[30].
The definitions introduced reflect the definitions set out in the ATAD Directive, in its original version. From 1 January 2019 Polish capital groups may be taxpayers for the purposes of the CFC rules and respectively foreign tax capital groups may be foreign controlled entities.
An important ruling in the scope of CFC regulation is the judgment of the CSF 31 to 26 February 2019 against the background of the correlation between the German legislation on a controlled foreign company (CFC) and the Union's free movement of capital.
In Polish circumstances, the judgment guidelines are relevant for taxpayers controlling CFCs of type I and type II, i.e. cases where foreign entities are located in the “non-EU” tax havens and non-contractual countries respectively, and taxpayers are minority investors in them.
New to the judgment commented on is the indication of expressis verbis that national CFC regulations aimed at cases of control over foreign entities from countries third may have a different dimension than the cases of such control exercised in relation to companies located in Member States.
Therefore, it is not appropriate to transfer the entire case law of the TS based on the freedom of establishment to the principle of freedom of movement of capital applicable to the States without modifying the entire acquis. third.
The most important interpretative directive of the judgment, in the context of the Polish CFC legislation, is to consider the guidance contained in the CFC statements on the mechanism for the effective exchange of tax information as a basis justifying the restrictive nature of the national CFC rules.
In the light of these guidelines, it should be considered that the legal presumptions applicable to taxable persons controlling CFCs Type I and Type II regarding the size and duration of the checks carried out are justified.
As regards CFC type I, the inviolable nature of that presumption should also be considered proportionate in the light of the TS’s finding that the taxpayer’s investment cannot be verified.
If the Member State in relation to the countries third is unable to obtain information confirming the taxpayer’s claims, then the non-application of the presumption, i.e. allowing the taxpayer to demonstrate the size and duration of his right to participate in the profits of CFC would not have any value.
In other words, there is no need to call on the taxpayer to demonstrate certain issues, since the Member State is later entitled to omit such information as it cannot confirm it by consulting the State of establishment of CFC.
This conclusion is further reinforced by the fact that the ATA Directive is based on Article 7(2) It also allows the use of an unrejected presumption for CFCs located in non-EU/EEA countries as to the inability of taxpayers to demonstrate that they carry out real business activities through the companies located there’ 32 .
Principles to address hybrid mismatches
A popular subject of tax planning research following the publication of the report by the OECD is the problem of hybridization, which is used by international corporations. Corporations use, inter alia,:
- • hybrid instruments,
- • hybrid transfers,
- • hybrid entities,
- • entities having a double tax residence.
The objective of the deliberate use of hybridisation by international corporations is to avoid taxing tax revenue from a specific tax title in two countries, at the same time obtaining the right to double deduction, i.e. both In one, and In the second the country can be defined as the cost of obtaining income.
It is also possible to deduct double the tax credits, namely the right to deduct the cost of obtaining income to a local entity. In one country on account of expenditure incurred against another entity located in another country (these entities are most often capital-linked).
These rights would not be granted to those entities without hybridisation, since the amount transferred between them does not constitute second tax revenue In one country and income to be deducted In the second country.
Such activities, i.e. the use of hybridisation by international corporations, contribute to the depletion of the state budget. Another important factor is that the use of hybridisation distorts competition in the market between countries, causing harmful tax competition.
Among the countries of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, the scale of hybridization is not exactly known. There is also no statistical data on the impact on State budget depletion. The only evidence of their occurrence is the results of proceedings carried out by tax authorities in some countries.
The case against four banks using hybridisation to obtain tax advantages and the tax amount to be paid was 1,300,000,000 EUR[33]. It should also be cited in 2006 a report from the U.S. tax administration that he mentioned 11 transactions carried out by international corporations.
The purpose of these transactions was to avoid hybridisation taxation, and the value of these transactions was close 3,500,000,000 USD. Moreover, according to the OECD report 34 , Italian tax administration defined in 2011 in tax proceedings an amount up to 1,500,000,000 EUR in proceedings against those applying hybridisation.
Summary
As we read in the justification for the Act introducing the exit tax system into the Polish tax system, the implementation of the solutions contained in the ATAD Directive in Polish tax laws aims to increase the effectiveness of national corporate tax systems in the field of anti-erosion of tax bases in the internal market and transfer profits outside the internal market.
The introduction into the Polish tax system of solutions proposed by the ATAD Directive is accompanied by an extraordinary optimism of the Polish legislator, who tries to "press" everything possible and even more in the fight against "aggressive tax optimization".
This is, of course, about the introduction of exit tax also to personal income tax (and not just to CIT). It's worth mentioning that Article 3 The ATAD does not preclude the application of national or contractual provisions to ensure a higher level of protection of national tax bases in relation to corporate taxation.
As you can see, in Poland, it was decided to provide a higher level of protection also for other taxes, which the Directive did not provide. The reading of the new legislation shows that this optimism has caused the principles of correct legislation to be pushed aside.
It is a matter of time for the Court of Justice of the European Union to comment on this matter, to which the complaints of taxpayers who see in the decisions of the legislator infringements of EU law will be submitted.
The consequences of the implementation of the ATAD Directive may therefore give rise to the same problems that Polish taxpayers have been facing for many years, i.e. unclear law, legislative errors, lengthy proceedings by tax authorities and changes in the interpretation and jurisprudence lines of administrative courts.
But must this be the price of an effective tax system in Poland?
Bibliography
- Bartosziewicz, "Agressive tax optimization" and criminal liability, "Tax Review" No. Regulation (EU) 9/2017.
- Dauter, Tax Ordinance. Commentary, XI. Wolters Kluwer Polska, Warsaw 2019.
- Litwinczuk, Transfer Price Regulations and General Anti-Tax Avoidance Standard, Tax Review No. Regulation (EU) 10/2018.
- Jankowski, Analysis of interpretative doubts around the term ‘interest part of the leasing instalment’ and the principle in dubio pro tributario, ‘Tax Monitor’ No. Regulation (EU) 11/2018.
- Guzek, M. Stefaniak, Tax Avoidance Clause, Tax Monitor No. Regulation (EU) 11/2016.
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Note: the subject of the article was the subject of a speech by Dr. Andrzej Dmowski at a nationwide scientific conference “Blacks and Shadows 15-year anniversary harmonisation of tax law’, which took place 2 July 2019 at the University of Warsaw.
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[1] Directive 2016/1164 to 12 July 2016 laying down rules to counter tax avoidance practices which have a direct impact on the functioning of the internal market (Official Journal of the European Union L from 19 July 2016 No 193, p. 1 as amended).
[2] Directive 2017/952 to 29 May 2017 amending Directive 2016/1164 on hybrid mismatches between countries third (Official Journal of the European Union L from 7 June 2017 No 144, p. 1).
[3] i.e. Journal of Laws of 2019, item 865.
[4] Article 2(1) ATAD directives.
[5] J. Jankowski, Analysis of interpretative doubts about the term ‘interest part of the leasing instalment’ and the principle in dubio pro tributario, ‘Tax Monitor’ No. Regulation (EU) 11/2018.
[6] Intervention by Mr Isabella Leschina 3 December 2018 on the scope of the free amount at exit tax, No 28029.
[7] Act of 26 July 1991 on income tax on individuals, i.e. Journal of Laws of 2018, item 1509, Further: u.p.d.o.f.
[8] Article 24f(2) the Corporate Income Tax Act and Article 30da(2) u.p.d.o.f.
[9] Article 24f(3) the Corporate Income Tax Act and Article 30da(4) u.p.d.o.f.
[10] Judgment of 29 November 2011, National Grid Indus BV v Inspector van de Belastingdienst Rijnmond/Kantor Rotterdam, C-371/10, CEU: ECLI: ECLI:EU:C:2011:785.
[11] Judgment of 25 April 2013, European Commission v Kingdom of Spain, C-64/11, CEU: ECLI: EU: C: 2013: 264.
[12] Judgment of 11 March 2004, Hughes de Lasteyriedu Saillant v Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances et de l’Industrie, C-9/02, The electronic collection of TEU Cases: 2004 I-02409.
[13] Judgment of 7 September 2006, N v Inspector van de Belastingdienst Oost/cantor Almelo, C-470/04, Electronic Reports of Cases TEU: ECLI:EU:C:2006:525.
[14] In this respect, the National Tax Advisory Board on 7 March 2019 adopted Resolution No Regulation (EU) 19/2019 (K.Dor.pod. z 2019 item 18) authorising the President of the CoR to sign and lodge a complaint with the European Commission concerning the infringement of European Union law.
[15] R. Relapse, Is the exit tax from individuals compatible with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland?, “Legal and Tax Advice - RB Newsletter”, no. 2 (7) 2019.
[16] Act of 23 October 2018 amending the Personal Income Tax Act, the Corporate Income Tax Act, the Act - Tax Ordinance and some other laws, Journal of Laws of 2018, item 2193 as amended
[17] M. Siwiński, Application rules Article 119a Tax Ordinance (tax evasion clause), ‘Tax advisor’ No Regulation (EU) 7/2017, p. 35-37.
[18] M. Guzek, M. Stefaniak, Tax Avoidance Clause, Tax Monitor No. Regulation (EU) 11/2016, p. 23.
[19] H. Litwinczuk, Transfer Price Regulations and General Anti-Tax Avoidance Standard, Tax Review No. Regulation (EU) 10/2018, p. 18-23.
[20] This is justified by the fact that, in this particular case, the case law of the European Court of Justice has developed the principle of the prohibition of abuse, which is in fact equivalent to the normative anti-tax avoidance clause. Cf. TS judgment of 21 February 2006, Halifax plc, Leed Permanent Development Services Ltd and Conty Wide Property Investments Ltd v Commissioners of Customs & Excise, C-255/02; ECLI:EU:C:2006:121.
[21] B. Dauter, Article 119((a) [in]: Tax Ordinance. Commentary, Issue XI, Wolters Kluwer Polska, Warsaw 2019.
[22] Article 119a(3) Act on 29 August 1997 - Tax Ordinance, i.e. Journal of Laws of 2019, item 900, Next: o.p.
[23] Article 5(4) the Treaty on European Union, Journal of Laws of 2004, item 864/30 as amended
[24] Article 3(18) o.p.
[25] Official Journal of the European Union L, No. 338, p. 41.
[26] B. Dauter, Article 119((d) [in]: Tax Ordinance. Commentary, Issue XI, Wolters Kluwer Polska, Warsaw 2019.
[27] A. Bartosziewicz, "Agressive tax optimization" and criminal liability, "Tax Review" No. Regulation (EU) 9/2017, p. 29-35.
Source note 28: Article 24a(2)(1) the Corporate Income Tax Act
[29] Ibid. Article 24a(2)(4)).
[30] Ibid. Article 24a(3)).
[31] Judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 February 2019 X-GmbH v Finanzamt Stuttgart - Körpersschaften, C-135/17; Official Journal of the European Union C Directive 2019/139/10.
[32] F. Majdowski. Application of CFC regulations to entities from countries third on the can of the judgment of the Court of Justice on the Union's freedom of movement of capital, ‘Tax Review’, No. Regulation EU) 6/2019, p. 28-36.
[33] The case concerned BNZ, Westpac, ASB Bank, ANZ National.
[34] OECD’s work on Aggressive Tax Planning, http://www.oecd.org/tax/aggressive/atp.htm