Where a gift of an object belonging to the common property of a spouse has been made to the benefit of one of them, to his personal property, this spouse must not be treated as a donor, with the effect that such a status would result for him in the possibility of withdrawing a donation in the event of (own) gross gratuitous ingratitude and in relation to the consequences of the multi-corporation of property donors belonging to the common property. In particular, citing a donation by two donors (co-married) cannot lead to a reduction in the impact of the one of them, the cancellation of a donation only to participate in the joint ownership of the property – this is the thesis of the Supreme Court ruling which upholds the existing judicature position on property transfers between spouses' assets during the period of the statutory property union.
The actual situation of the matter that was to be assessed was as follows: the woman in favor of her husband made a personal donation to him and to his property in the form of a property that was a component of the common property.
In time, she realized that her husband was not necessarily faithful, as evidenced by his personal records of prostitutes and by visiting numerous marriage and dating portals, confirmed by the history of the computer's web browser. These behaviors provided official grounds for accepting that the husband had committed adultery in marriage.
As can be seen from this example, the legislature has left a great deal of freedom in the formation of a marital property system, but the courts continue to ensure that this does not adversely affect the spouse, who has less fantasy, including in terms of sharing the property
The woman brought an action, requesting her husband's commitment to make a declaration of will to transfer the property to her or, possibly, to transfer to her personal property a share of the property. The defendant's existence of an obligation to make such a statement was considered by the plaintiff in an effective appeal made to him by a property donation (based on Article 898(1) Civil Code, which allows such a possibility in case of gross gratuitous ingratitude given).
In the course of the trial, the court found that the defendant, using the power of attorney given to him by the plaintiff, had sold to his father numerous valuable properties belonging to the common property, without actually obtaining payment for them.
These properties were subsequently donated by the father to the defendant, resulting in their acquisition into the defendant's personal property.
The defendant also deprived the plaintiff of the possibility of using the funds used jointly, including those covered by the law, by transferring these funds to the defendant's personal account and by blocking the credit card used by the plaintiff.
In the light of such findings, the defendant considered that he would not deny the fulfilment of the condition necessary for the effective cancellation of the donation, but that the institution could be used in this particular situation at all.
In the proceedings before the Supreme Court, he decided to challenge the practice accepted by the courts, consisting in appealing without the consent of his spouse during the duration of the statutory association of a donation from the common property.
Due to the recognition of the action by the courts of lower instances, the defendant has, inter alia, formulated a plea of violation of substantive law by misinterpretation Article 898(1) KC.
This violation was to be demonstrated after first, the acceptance by you of the possibility of recalling, during the duration of the statutory partnership, a donation made from the common property and the acceptance of the position that the donor spouse may, without the consent of his or her spouse, request the return of ownership of the donated property to the common property.
The Supreme Court found the above allegations to be untrue. He pointed out that, in principle, there is no doubt about the admissibility of transfers of assets leading to the regulation as a matter of common property for the benefit of the spouse, to his personal property (resolution 7 SN judges from 10 April 1991, III CZP 76/90).
In addition, the defendant credited himself with the status of donor, due to the origin of the object of the donation from the common property and the consent of the plaintiff to make the donation.
However, in the circumstances of the complainant’s case, it could not be considered as a donor since the donation received by the conclusion of the donation agreement did not come at the expense of his assets (Article 888 in fine KC).
In legal and economic terms, the defendant was not a donor, as he concluded the contract as a gifted one and became the beneficiary of the delivery. Therefore, his statement of cancellation of the donation was not required.
second an important issue in this case is whether the defendant's consent to revoke the donation was required as a joint estate management activity, which was originally the property.
The Supreme Court pointed out that, unlike a gift from a common property, the cancellation of a gift is not a management activity of that property, so it does not require the consent of a spouse. According to Article 36(2) dd.
2 The execution of the board of directors covers activities which concern property belonging to the common assets, whereas as a result of a donation previously made, property ownership ceased to be a component of that property and was part of the defendant's personal property.
The cancellation of the donation resulted in a bond effect, i.e. the creation of a gifted obligation to reverse the transfer of property to the plaintiff as a donor, with the effect of returning that component to the common assets of the parties.
The defendant was therefore neither a donor nor a person competent to give consent to the operation of the property, since at the time of the cancellation the donation was no longer a joint asset.
As can be seen from this example, the legislature has left a great deal of freedom in the formation of the marital property system, but the courts continue to ensure that this does not adversely affect the spouse, who has less fantasy, including in terms of sharing the property.
Source: Supreme Court ruling from 28 March 2019, reference no. I CSK 13/18
Author:
Rafał Czepik, legal advisor, graduate of the Faculty of Law at the University of Warsaw, specialist in economic and civil law