The ruling given by the Supreme Court concerns the basic principle of the liability of spouses described in Article 41(1) Code of Family and Care. According to her, if the spouse has entered into an obligation with the agreement of the spouse, the creditor may also demand the satisfaction of the property of the spouse. If, on the other hand, the spouse has made a commitment without the consent of the spouse, the creditor may require the satisfaction of the debtor’s personal assets only.
The case based on this principle was examined by the District Court in Tarnów. In this case, the creditor held a valid order for payment against the debtor who rented the premises from him for business activity. The execution of the debtor’s estate proved ineffective. Consequently, the creditor requested the court to grant a declaration of enforceability also to the debtor's husband. The creditor indicated that the debtor’s husband had agreed to a commitment.
The Supreme Court has indicated that the creditor’s right to satisfy the assets of the joint spouses on the basis of Article 41(1) The KRIO can also be implemented by bringing an action against the debtor's spouse.
The court is entitled to grant a declaration of enforceability to the debtor's spouse (with limitation of his liability to property covered by the common interest) only if the creditor demonstrates by document that the undertaking was made with the consent of the debtor's spouse (Article 787 KPC).
In view of this provision, the Tarnów District Court refused to grant a declaration of enforceability to the debtor's husband. The creditor was unable to demonstrate by document that the claim was created with the consent of the debtor's husband.
The creditor therefore decided to sue the debtor's husband directly. In separate proceedings, documents may be withdrawn from the rigor to the consent of the spouse to enter into debt. When showing consent second the spouse may also rely on evidence other than documentary evidence.
However, the Tarnów District Court dismissed the action, indicating that the party to the agreement from which the claim is based is only one spouse, so second the spouse has no co-debtor status. Liability second the spouse is limited to abolishing executions against common property.
The creditor appealed against such a decision to the District Court, and he pointed out that until now the question of whether the creditor could exercise his right also by bringing proceedings against the spouse, even if there was a judgment against the spouse, the debtor. The Tarnów District Court stated that the above legal question raised serious doubts and referred them to the Supreme Court for resolution.
The question asked by the District Court was, "Is it foreseen in Article 41(1) The right of the creditor to satisfy the assets of the joint spouses may also be exercised by bringing an action against the debtor's spouse for an obligation to comply with a benefit arising from a legal act which the debtor's spouse has not been party to, and shall that right remain valid even if that benefit is already covered by an enforcement title issued previously against the debtor?"
In favour of allowing a trial against a spouse, there is a legal relationship between the debtor's creditor and the spouse who has agreed to the commitment, although different from the parties to the contract. In the view of the District Court, it can be argued that the creditor may bring proceedings second the spouse as much as the debtor. The adoption of such an option would be beneficial for the protection of the creditor and the responsibility of the spouse.
The possibility of giving legal action against the debtor's spouse is also supported by the possibility described above to depart from the rigor of submitting documents to the consent of the spouse to take up the debt. Creditor when showing consent second the spouse may rely on non-documentary evidence, which means that her rights can be exercised more effectively.
The Supreme Court agreed to the proposed argument and on 11 April 2019 adopted a resolution on the signature III CZP 106/18. He pointed out that the creditor's right to satisfy his spouse's common assets on the basis of Article 41(1) The KRIO can also be implemented by bringing an action against the debtor's spouse.
This means that he is obliged to comply with a benefit arising from a legal act which the defendant’s spouse was not party to, regardless of whether that benefit is covered by an enforcement title previously issued against the debtor himself.
In arguing his position, the Supreme Court added that although the debtor’s spouse is not a co-debtor, he is liable for the repayment of the debt. He is a so-called enforcement co-debtor who must endure execution from the property of the joint spouses.
It is therefore appropriate to allow the possibility of suing the debtor's spouse, since the right to legitimately protect the creditor and the liability of the debtor. Taking the opposite position would mean an unjustified imbalance between the protection of the debtor and the creditor.