The issue of limitation of claims in respect of franc credit agreements. Part 2

The standard rules governing the limitation institution in Polish law indicate six years (to 9 July 2018 ten-year) period of limitation from the date on which the claim became due [1] .

In the event of an undue benefit, which is the payment of instalments of credit for an invalid credit agreement, it shall start separately for each outstanding benefit. However, this situation is detrimental to consumers in disputes with the entrepreneur, who in an adhesive way prepared a contractual standard containing unfair provisions.

Well, with commitments lasting for decades, it may turn out that, at the time the borrower learned of the flaw in his contract, a large part of his claim could already be outlawed.

This would result in an imbalance between the parties, as, when the parties have been cleared after the final declaration of the termination of the contract and the national statute of limitations has been taken into account, the trader would not be severely sanctioned for the use of abusive clauses in the models which he has prepared, which would mean that the deterrent effect and the rights of consumers resulting from the limitation would not be achieved.

Directive 93/13 [2] . In order to properly implement its assumptions, national law must be interpreted in accordance with the interpretation of Union law and taking into account the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

Synchronization of the Polish and EU legal order changes the current use of statute of limitations by national courts.

The importance of the functioning of the principle of consumer protection in Union law and the importance of the European Union itself is illustrated by the analysis of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (TEU).

The task of the TEU is to ensure a uniform interpretation of the acquis communautaire and to ensure that EU Member States and any EU institution comply with it.

It should also be stressed that the TEU is the only EU institution able to impose an interpretation of Union law on national courts in order to ensure its one hundred the same way throughout the European Union.

National judicial authorities, on the other hand, are required to make use of its jurisprudence and to apply their own law, taking account of EU legislation as far as possible (including the objectives invoked). Directive 93/13.

Case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union on ‘franc loans’

From the point of view of the courts of the Member States' ‘franc cases’, the judgment of the EU Court of Justice of 2009 examining the question referred for a preliminary ruling by the Spanish court [3] , which was about interpretation. Directive 93/13.

The main point of the TEU's consideration was whether the national court should, of its own motion, raise the unfairness of the contractual condition in the course of the examination of the application for the initiation of a final judgment of an amicable court issued without the consumer being present.

In the facts examined by the Court, this was a record to the arbitration court and the consumer did not file an action at the time applied.

The CJEU explicitly stated that the time limit for bringing an appeal could only start from the date on which the judgment was served to the consumer, since it was not possible to examine in depth the merits and validity of that ruling and to draw up a possible objection.

‘So in the present case, the consumer could not be in a situation where the time limit for bringing a complaint would begin to run or even expire before he even learned of the consequences for him from an unfair record in the arbitration court’ [4] .

This means that the EU Court has legal effects (in this case, the start of the time limit for bringing a complaint) on the possibility for the consumer to take a consumer's awareness of the unfairness of the reference to the arbitration court one from the terms of his contract with the entrepreneur.

The Court referred, in its judgment, both to the principle of equivalence and effectiveness, and stressed that Article 6 Directive 93/13 is intended to protect the consumer as a weaker party, even if, as was the case in the circumstances of the case, it has shown complete inactivity and has not brought an appeal against it within the time limit.

In view of the above-mentioned EU rules, the CJEU held that the national court should, of its own motion, assess the unfair nature of the provision to the arbitration court (even if the judgment of the arbitration court already constitutes res judicata) and ‘pure any resulting consequences under national law to ensure that the provision is not binding on the consumer’ [5] .

What is also important, the TEU considered that due to the importance of consumer protection provided by Article 6 Directive 93/13, This provision should be adopted as ‘equivalent to national legislation having a level of public policy within the national legal order’. [6] .

Similarly, the Court of Justice ruled in another case, including the Spanish reference for a preliminary ruling on the limitation of the national court’s effects at the time of the finding of a unfair contractual condition [7] .

In the present case, the Supreme Court of Spain pointed to the flaw in the provision of the contract between the consumer and the entrepreneur concerning the minimum rate below which the variable interest rate could not have fallen.

In the statement of reasons, that court found that the requirement to express contractual terms was not complied with in a simple and understandable language (the principle of transparency) and pointed out that the information obligation on the part of the trader had not been sufficiently fulfilled, which was due to Directive 93/13.

It therefore annulled the contested conditions, while maintaining the contract in force, but limited the effects of its ruling to the possibility for consumers to demand payment of benefits paid under unfair clauses paid after the date of the judgment.

The Court of Justice has not completely divided the opinion of the national court, recalling that ‘the conditions laid down by national law to which it refers Article 6(1) Directive 93/13, they must not jeopardise the substance of the law which consumers derive from this provision of interpretation of the case law of the Court’ [8] .

On the other hand, the decision given by the Supreme Court of Spain limited the rights of consumers by denying their claim for reimbursement of amounts unduly paid for the contested contractual terms paid throughout the credit period.

It should be noted that the determination of the unfair nature of a given condition should be treated as if it were never in the contract, which entails an appropriate restitution effect on the reimbursement of the amounts collected from that condition [9] .

The Court also held that a judgment given by a national court provides incomplete and insufficient protection to consumers and violates the essence of the Article 7(1) Directive 93/13, the purpose of which is to deter an entrepreneur from further applying such practices.

Since the Spanish judgment was not excessive for an entrepreneur applying unfair contractual terms, the Court of Justice, given the facts of the case, ruled that Article 6(1) Directive 93/13:

it must be interpreted as contrary to national jurisprudence limiting in time the restitution effects of the finding of unfairness, within the meaning of Article 3(1) that directive – a condition in a contract concluded with the consumer by the entrepreneur only up to amounts unduly paid on the basis of such a condition after the court has declared the unfair nature [10] .

It follows from this that, after recognition of the unfair nature of the contract, the rightholder may claim reimbursement of the benefits paid for the entire period of time, and not only from the time of the judgment in that case. [11] .

With regard to consumer awareness of the defective nature of his contract, the essential position of the TEU in the judgment responding to the questions referred by the Romanian court concerning the interpretation of the provisions Directive 93/13 [12] .

In the cases on which both national courts and the EU Court were based, there was no doubt that the consumer, when concluding a contract with an entrepreneur, was a weaker party because he was unable to negotiate and signed the contractual standard imposed on him and the contested provisions were indeed unfair.

In its statement of reasons, the CJEU cited its own case law on the consequences of such a situation, which gave rise to the decision under consideration, which resulted in a lack of legal certainty for consumers and the possibility for them to recover sums paid to the bank.

In this respect, the Court, having regard to the principle of legal certainty, has agreed that the existence of a claim for annulment of an unfair condition is not subject to limitation, but may be the beginning of a time limit for a claim for payment where:

the time limit will not be less favourable than the time limits for similar measures in national law (the principle of equivalence) and will not make the exercise of rights conferred by the Union legal order, in particular Directive 93/13, practically impossible or excessively difficult (principle of effectiveness) [13] .

The Court of Justice did not consider it appropriate to submit to the referring court that the consumer may bring an action for payment only during the period until three years after the complete execution of the contract.

At the same time, he rejected the argument that this corresponds to the moment when the contracting party should know or be able to find out about the unfair condition. Nor did he agree with the view that this was the last time it acted as a less vulnerable consumer in a given obligation relationship.

According to the Court’s ruling, this was a breach of the principle of effectiveness by unduly obstructing the exercise of rights conferred on the consumer by Directive 93/13.

Given that the contract concluded with the entrepreneur is of an adhesic nature, it is possible that the borrower, when repaying the loan, did not know that there was a defective clause in his contract.

Furthermore, the interpretation of the national law of the referring State indicates that the time limit for bringing an action starts on the date on which the court establishes the ineffectiveness of unfair conditions (‘the circumstances underlying the action’ [14] ), Whereas the referring court applied a different time limit (less favourable) for claims resulting from protection granted on the basis of Directive 93/13, which runs counter to the principle of equivalence.

The Court of Justice also rejected the position of the referring court relating to the claim that, after the performance of the contract, the party loses the status of the consumer and cannot rely on the provisions Directive 93/13.

In its position to this judgment, the Government of the Republic of Poland rightly noted that this reasoning is unacceptable in the case of sales contracts which often end immediately after they have been concluded. In this context, accepting such a theory would deprive the consumer of any protection.

It follows from the above ruling that the party does not lose its consumer status after performance of the contract, for example, the total repayment of the credit.

In addition, it was found that it would be correct to calculate the limitation period for claims relating to payment of undue benefits to the trader paid under unfair contractual terms only after the party became aware of their existence in the contract.

It should be noted that even the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Poland concluded that the possibility of a limitation period for a claim for compensation of damage to a person before the injured person finds out about its recovery is incompatible with the constitution [15] .

From the point of view of the issue of limitation of claims in respect of ‘francised loans’, it appears important to have been the decision of the TEU on the payment order procedure on the basis of its own notes which secures the obligations under the consumer credit agreement [16] .

In the course of this procedure before the TEU, Advocates-General in their opinions considered that the national provisions of the Civil Procedure Code [17] It makes it difficult for the consumer to exercise their rights by granting too little time (two weeks) for the preparation of a large amount of information requiring expertise, that is to say, whether the order is brought in full or in part, to present the pleas and facts and evidence under the rigor of inadmissibility of this letter [18] .

Moreover, the amount of the judicial costs for the submission of such a letter appeared to be unduly burdensome for the consumer, which could have deterred him from pressing charges. In their view, these factors gave rise to a significant risk that the party would not choose to send such a letter or be deemed inadmissible by the court.

In the Court’s view, in a situation where a court examining a order for payment cannot assess the possible unfair nature of a given contractual condition, since ‘the exercise of the right to lodge charges against such an order does not allow the consumer to ensure compliance with the rights under that directive’ [19] , This is contrary to interpretation Article 7(1) Directive 93/13.

The scope of consumer awareness was therefore also affected by ignorance or misunderstanding of the scope of their rights.

A factual summary of the judgments described above is the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which has fallen upon the Slovak case for the credit agreement [20] . It was only after the consumer had fully repaid his obligation that he learned from a professional proxy that his contract contained unfair terms.

He therefore decided to sue the entrepreneur who prepared the contractual standard.

In the course of the trial, the defendant raised a plea of limitation because, according to the Slovak law, it is equal to three the years counted from the point of unwarranted enrichment, which in the present case is the payment of the benefit by the borrower.

It should be noted that for the law of the State of reference, there is an irrelevant question of consumer awareness of the existence of unfair conditions or the possibility of such assessment, which means that the right to bring an action could expire even if the person did not know that he could claim.

The EU Court considered that both the existence of a limitation period and its duration are not incompatible with Directive 93/13.

However, the time at which the limitation period begins is contrary to the principle of effectiveness, which requires that "a national procedural provision does not make it impossible or too difficult to apply Union law" [21] .

Given that the Slovak law does not distinguish between the acquisition or lack of awareness as regards the possibility of bringing an action, the TEU considered that there was a risk that the consumer would not be able to rely on the rights conferred by EU law within the prescribed time limit.

In the course of its ruling, the EU Court has cited numerous examples of its case-law indicating that the borrower’s position vis-à-vis the trader is worse in terms of both negotiating capacity and knowledge and experience.

It is very likely that the consumer does not know or understand the powers conferred on him Directive 93/13, what the lender can use.

The Advocate General rightly pointed out in his opinion that in commitments entered into for a considerable period of time, it may turn out that consumer claims will be subject to limitation before the loan period is over.

This creates an impossibility or significant difficulty not to pursue its claims on payments under unfair contractual terms within the meaning of Directive 93/13 [22] . In view of the above, the CSF concluded that

the principle of effectiveness must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which provides that the consumer’s claim for reimbursement of amounts not unduly paid under unfair contractual conditions within the meaning of Directive 93/13 or conditions contrary to the requirements Directive 2008/48 is subject to a three-year limitation period starting on the date on which the undue enrichment occurred [23] .

Such an interpretation should be applied directly to the interpretation by the Polish courts of the general rules governing the beginning of the limitation period, as they are very similar to the Slovak legal order.

When adopting the assumptions developed by the TEU, it should be made clear that any way of calculating a limitation period without taking into account consumer awareness of the existence of unfair terms in its contract is grossly contrary to the principle of effectiveness and the EU directives.

The EU Court directly confirmed this In the next Judgment: ‘It should be noted that the limitation period may be in line with the principle of effectiveness only if the consumer had the opportunity to know his rights before or after the start of the run’ [24] .

The doctrine largely accepts the claims contained in the judgments of the Court of Justice.

There is no doubt that Directive 93/13 is intended to interfere with the obligation relationship between the consumer and the trader when the principle of equal treatment of the parties is breached by adding a unfair condition to the contract concluded.

In such a case, the provisions Directive 93/13 are intended to achieve a balance of rights and obligations between the parties, inter alia by recognising such a provision as a non-binding consumer (as a weaker and de facto party dependent on the other party to the drawing up of the contract) resulting in its non-existence from the very beginning.

It should be noted that this effect is directly attributable to the law (cf. Article 6(1) Directive 93/13 and Article 3851 (k.c.), not just a court judgment.

This allows consumers to seek the payment of wrongly paid benefits for this purpose, which can only be limited by the principle of legal certainty, manifested, for example, by res judicata.

In this context, the li terature underlines that Member States, including legislators and national courts, must not limit, at the time when the unfair nature of the condition is established, and therefore, for example, exclude the possibility to pursue restitution claims in whole or in part (e.g.

in relation to the time preceding such statement) [25] .

This means that borrowers repaying ‘franc loans’ on the basis of non-fair contractual terms were never, in fact, obliged to pay capital or interest payments to the bank, as well as any other fees related to the loan, and can now, by court, claim reimbursement of all these benefits from the entire loan period to date. [26] .

Impact of the EU legal order on the Polish jurisprudence line

The most recent case law of the Polish courts also seems to share the position relating to the calculation of the time limit only from the moment when the consumer could actually make his claim, i.e. when it was objectively possible to assume that he knew or should already know that his credit agreement was flawed.

In this respect, it should be pointed out that the judgment of SO in Wrocław dated 10 September 2020 in case XII C 655/19, in which the court both established the nullity of the entire credit agreement (in particular considering that the mere mobilisation of funds in tranches of different rates was incorrect as it enabled the borrower to have previously known the amount of the liability in indexation currency) and judged the reimbursement of the benefits unduly paid to the bank for the entire credit period.

The Court of First Instance recalled that the repayment of a loan is not an interim benefit — that is one pre-established benefit, only that broken down into parts [27] . The same judgment was given in the case against a bank providing loans denominated in CHF [28] .

In the case pending before the District Court of Świdnica, a ruling was issued stating that the consolidation credit agreement was invalid.

In addition, the bank was required, according to the theory two the conditions recognised by the court ruling to reimburse the borrower of all amounts in PLN and CHF from the date of conclusion of the contract in 2005.

This ruling is very beneficial for borrowers, since taking into account ten-year the limitation period would reduce the value of the claim by the amount of instalments paid over the period to 2010.

The Court also considered that more could be required from the defendant as a professional, and since she had drawn up an agreement containing unfair clauses, she should suffer the consequences.

There is no reason to maintain the contract in force as a standard gold loan using the LIBOR reference rate, as such has never been offered by any bank.

Moreover, it cannot be supplemented by any references to the provisions of the dispositive or the NBP course, so when the denomination mechanism is excluded it is impossible to implement [29] .

The issue of statute of limitations on "franc credits" also began to be the agenda of the Supreme Court. In one of Last resolutions The Supreme Court took a position on limitation of claims for reimbursement of unduly satisfied benefits [30] .

He confirmed that the limitation of the bank’s claim for repayment of the loan amount was three years both when the contract is valid and when it is invalid.

He did not see the imbalance in the meaning of the different terms for the consumer and the bank, as the legislator assumes that the entrepreneur is a professional in his field and can better care for his interests.

According to the Supreme Court of the Union and its own case law, the limitation period should start from the date on which the borrower either requested the annulment of the credit agreement or its sanitisation [31] . It was only then that the lack of a legal basis became final and the parties to the contract could claim the reimbursement of benefits under it.

Consequently, the Supreme Court pointed out that the limitation of the bank’s claim could not be considered to be ‘as if the call for repayment of the loan made available were already possible on the date of its release’ [32] .

The next resolution did not state that the limitation period for consumer claims — the borrower can only begin when “he was aware or should reasonably know of the unlawful nature of the provision. It must be considered that only then could he call on the entrepreneur to repay the benefit (cf. Article 455 k.c.), i.e.

take the action in question under Article 120(1) k.c.’ [33] , confirmed the earlier achievements of the Tri Bunal of Justice of the European Union.

The national courts have begun to take over the above argument with regard to the limitation charge raised by the bank against consumer claims – as an example of taking a decision from the recovery or failure of a defective contract, it is possible to state a specific request for action. [34] .

This means that the bank’s claim for repayment of the loan is also limited by time three years from the date of service to the bank of the lawsuit [35] .

Activities undertaken against the bank as a basis for the commencement of the limitation period

The above shows that Directive 93/13, Like Polish and European jurisprudences, it treats the consumer as a worse side, which, in confidence, goes to a large and professional financial entity, which is the bank, hoping to conclude a fair credit agreement.

The borrower, when concluding a contract with the bank, had no reason to believe that he could be cheated by the bank operator by using his stronger position, inter alia by preparing a contractual pattern aimed at achieving an undisclosed profit in the form of so-called spreads. Use of the power resulting from Article 1171 k.c.

and not taking into account the expiry of the limitation period for a bank’s claim against the consumer while maintaining the possibility for borrowers to claim reimbursement of benefits only from the last ten years before the action would therefore be contrary to the principles of social coexistence [36] and the protection of consumer rights developed by EU authorities.

However, this provision refers to the interests of both parties (both property, personal and family) and to the reasons for the rightfulness of moral values such as honesty, kindness, and loyalty.

On the other hand, in the case of ‘franc loans’, which is the result of the analysis, the bank (the entrepreneur) could in many cases act unfairly and disloyally, using the same trust towards the consumer [37] .

„This provision can therefore only be applied if the debtor has acted wrongly from the point of view of the principles of fairness, giving rise to the reinforcement of selected case-law relating to the abuse of the limitation charge’. [38] .

It should be made clear that the borrower was not at any point acting in a reprehensible manner and in accordance with the agreement concluded (unlawful) he paid the instalments for fear of its termination and placing the entire amount in an immediate state of enforceability, of entering the debtors in the register, or of even referring the case to enforcement proceedings.

Therefore, the cited Article 1171 k.c. should not favour an entrepreneur in matters of "franc credit", in which it could in many cases be considered to be guilty of unfair contractual terms, in which the borrowers were not aware of the conflicts with the law.

Adoption of a general limitation period at the time ten the years for each instalment paid separately should consistently entail taking into account the three-year deadline for the bank's claim for repayment of the amount of credit mobilised from the date of the mobilisation of the funds due to Article 118 k.c.

Against this background, situations involving ordering the borrower to pay the difference between the amount of unlimited repayments and the amount of funds mobilised, despite the payment of the nominal value of the credit, would be grossly detrimental to the interests of the consumer and would strongly favour second page.

It should be considered that the most important rule developed by the EUSEU is that the limitation period for consumer claims arising from Directive 93/13 only from the moment he realized, or could have done so, the existence of unfair warrants in his contract with the entrepreneur (seller or service provider).

However, the principle of equality between the parties and legal certainty should also be respected and an objective deadline should be set for the start of the limitation period.

It will definitely be the moment when the borrower took any action against the bank, which shows that he has knowledge of the flaw in the credit agreement he has signed.

Such actions may include a complaint to a bank which may at the same time include a proposal for out-of-court resolution of the dispute or a call for payment of wrongly received benefits, a call for a settlement attempt [39] or conduct proceedings before the Financial Ombudsman [40] or Bank Arbitrator [41] .

In the case of borrowers who immediately brought proceedings, it should be assumed that the date on which the borrower could objectively find out that the contract was flawed 3 October 2019, when the Court of Justice issued a judgment in the Polish case Kamila and Justyna Dziubak v Raiffeisen Bank International AG operating in Poland in the form of a branch called Raiffeisen Bank International AG Branch in Pol-sce based in Warsaw, which took over the loan portfolio of the former Polbank EGF S.A.

[42] This ruling was widely discussed in the media and began mass action against various banks providing "franc loans".

Therefore, it can be assumed that from that point on, the borrower (having even average knowledge, to no extent unrelated to law or banking) could de facto have acquired awareness of the existence of unfair terms in his indexed/denomised credit agreement, although for a long time the ‘francised credit’ case has aroused a lot of emotion and is often commented on.

In the light of the Supreme Court resolution dated 16 February 2021 an alternative to this assumption could also be to adopt the initial date of limitation as the date on which the action was brought or served on the defendant [43] .

Both EU legislation and jurisprudence have developed a number of rules and principles aimed at protecting consumers, which Polish courts have a duty to take into account when judging.

This means that the general national standards on limitation and, in particular, the timing of its calculation, must be corrected by regulations drawn up by the European Union authorities, which place considerable emphasis on the protection of consumer rights.

Implementation Directive 93/13 they seek to ensure a genuine legal and economic balance between the parties to the agreement. In addition, sanctions for the application of unfair terms by an entrepreneur should have a deterrent effect against the continued application of such practices.

It follows from the analysis of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union that for the consumer (the borrower), the limitation period for redress should begin from the moment when he could objectively assume that his contract was flawed.

This position is also shared by Polish courts investigating ‘franc loans’, which is a very beneficial solution for borrowers who feel cheated and affected by banks.

However, time will show the direction in which the current jurisprudence will ultimately be heading and whether banks will suffer the severe consequences of long-term unfairness- it will profit at the expense of its customers.

However, despite the adoption of such an opt-out resulting from the analysis of the rules and jurisprudence, which is in principle advantageous to the borrower, it is always important to bear in mind the risks they pose in bringing an action that also expose themselves to the negative consequences of questioning the credit agreement.

These include, for example, the exercise by the creditor of the right to re-examine creditworthiness, which, in the event of a poor assessment, may even result in the termination of the contract and an immediate request for and a one-off repayment of the remaining debt or the possibility for the bank to demand remuneration for the uncontractual use of capital.

The issue of limitation of claims of both bank and borrowers is still inconsistent in Poland and contains rules that are different from those adopted in the Polish legal order.

Given that the current ‘franc loans’ are one with major problems of the common courts, this aspect requires an in-depth analysis and interpretation by both the Supreme Court and the Tribunal of Justice of the European Union [44] .

Thus, in the near future, there will be a number of decisions of these institutions having a significant impact on Polish case law.

Bibliography

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Chabańki J., Koniecny T., Korpalski M., Guide to Francowicz, Warsaw 2020.

Fras M., Habdas M., Zakrzewski P., Comment to Article 1171, [in:] Civil code. Comment to Article 117-125, ed. M. Fras, M. Habdas, Warsaw 2019.

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the consumer, [in:] Civil code. Commentary, ed. J. Czyszewski, P. Nazaruk, Warsaw 2019.

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Judgment of the SA in Białystok dated 15 September 2020, reference no. I ACa 177/19, LEX No. 3153279. Judgment SA in Katowice dated 12 April 2021, reference no. I ACa 1026/18, non-publ.

Judgment of the SN dated 11 December 2019, V CSK 382/18, LEX No. 2771344. Judgment of SO in Świdnica dated 5 November 2020, I C 997/20, non-publ. SO judgment in Wrocław dated 10 September 2020, XII C 655/19, non-publ.

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-White v. Mariusz Wawroski, LEX No. 2600265

of which he was repealed Act dated 4 July 2019 amending the Act — Code of Civil Procedure and certain other laws (Journal of Laws of 2019, item 1469), Whereas second on the basis of the same amendment, it has acquired a new wording which is less demanding for the complainant from the previous version of the provision.

limitation, “Financial and Financial Law” 26, 2020, No 2, p. 78.

— the court declared the credit agreement invalid ex tunc, and therefore obliged the bank to reimburse all benefits paid to it by the borrowers

to the consumer, [in:] Civil code. Commentary, ed. J. Czyszewski, P. Nazaruk, Warsaw 2019, for: https://sip.lex.pl/#/commentary/587804374/601814?tocHit=1 (access: 21 November 2020).

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/587783936/581376?TocHit=1 (access: 21 November 2020).

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ek Raiffeisen Bank International AG, operating in Poland in the form of a branch called Raiffeisen Bank International AG Branch in Poland, ECLI EU C z 2019, item 819.

Abstract: The beginning of the 21st century is a time of mass lending by banks denominated or indexed to a Swiss franc. The borrowers, assured of the security and benefits of ‘franc loans’, signed contracts containing numerous legal defects, including unauthorised contractual provisions (abuse clauses).

Currently, the problems of credit agreements such as the abuzzness of conversion clauses, the failure of banks to comply with customer information obligations when concluding contracts and other infringements of banking and civil law are heavily affected by the courts of EU Member States, including Polish courts, and the TEU.

However, the main issue is the fact that such contracts are considered invalid in their entirety and the consequent need to settle the parties for the increasingly frequent annulment of such contracts by courts.

The considerations set out in this Article focus on the extremely relevant dispute over the nullity of credit agreements with regard to the limitation of the claims of borrowers who, when suing banks, demand the reimbursement of the benefits paid by them to the banks not due to them from the very moment the contract was concluded.

The jurisprudence of the Polish courts and the TEU, whose judgments indicate that the limitation period can only begin once the borrower has acquired the knowledge that the contract he has concluded is defective, so that the action can be brought effectively.

Article reprinted with permission of the author. Source: Student Law, Administrative and Economic Work, Wroclaw University

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